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THROUGH THE ANTIBOYCOTT MORASS TO
AN EXPORT PRIORITY*
I. INTRODUCTION
United States policy regarding unsanctioned international
boycotts was formed during a two year period of intense congres-
sional debate, culminating with the passage of the Export Ad-
ministration Act Amendment of 1977 (EAA)' and the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 (TRA).2 Concern over this area of law has not ended
with the diminution of political controversy, however, because full
implementation of the antiboycott laws has created what appear
to be some significant long term problems for U.S. exports; the
focus has shifted from formulating a policy to living with its en-
forcement.
This Note examines export problems arising from the enforce-
ment of U.S. antiboycott policy, but does not challenge the fun-
damental premise that U.S. businesses should not comply with un-
sanctioned international boycotts. Rather the focus is on the
cumulative effect upon business of the overlapping and inconsis-
tent regulatory schemes purporting to implement the policy. Sec-
tions II and III examine the objectives and provisions of the
antiboycott laws: the EAA, the TRA, and antitrust law,' noting
* A version of this Note was published in 3 MIDDLE EAST MONTHLY BOYCOTT L. BULL.
91-105, 121-132 (1979). Both versions of this Note have benefitted from comments and
criticism by Donald Alford Weadon, Jr., Esq., San Francisco, Calif. The views expressed
herein, as well as any errors, are the authors'.
I Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended by Export Administration Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as EAA]. See generally Ludwig and Smith, The Business Effects of the Antiboycott
Provisions of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977-Morality Plus
Pragmatism Equals Complexity, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 581 (1978); reprinted in 2 MIDDLE
EAST MONTHLY BOYCOTT L. BULL. 229 (1978) [hereinafter cited to BULL. pagination]; Fried-
man, Confronting the Arab Boycott- A Lawyer's Baedeker, 19 HARV. INT'L L. J. 443 (1978);
Williams, U.S. Regulation of Arab Boycott Practices, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 815 (1978);
McCarthy and McKenzie, Commerce Department Regulations Governing Participation by
United States Persons in Foreign Boycotts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193 (1978). See also
Mersky and Richmond, Legal Implications of the Arab Economic Boycott of the State of
IsraeL" A Research Guide, 71 L. LIB. J. 68 (1977).
1 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1061-1064, 1066, 1067, 90 Stat. 1525 (ad-
ding I.R.C. §§ 908, 999; modifying I.R.C. §§ 952, 995) [hereinafter cited as I.R.C. § 999]. See
generally Friedman, supra note 1; Bricker, Comprehensive Review of Rules Under Anti-
Boycott Tax Guidelines, 2 MIDDLE EAST MONTHLY BOYCOTT L. BULL. 281 (1978); Rubenfeld,
Legal and Tax Implications of Participation in International Boycotts, 32 TAX L. REV. 613
(1977); (19781 TAX MNGM'T (BNA) § 999-Int'l Boycott Determinations [hereinafter cited as
BNA PORTFOLIO].
' Sherman Act Section 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1976). See generally Friedman, note 1 supra;
Kestenbaum, The Arab Boycott in US. Law: Flawed Remedies for an International Trade
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lack of clarity and inconsistencies within each law. Section IV
reviews the inconsistencies among the laws, and Section V follows
with an examination of the impact these inconsistencies have upon
businesses. In light of the need for a coordinated export policy,
some adjustment in the regulatory schemes of United States anti-
boycott law is in order and, indeed, can be accomplished in a
fashion accordant with the underlying objectives of United States
policy in the antiboycott area. Thus, in Section VI, administrative
and legislative measures to reduce these effects are proposed.
II. THE POLICIES OF ANTIBOYCOTT LAWS
The objective of an antiboycott law should be to prevent U.S.
persons from complying with certain aspects of unsanctioned
foreign boycotts. To do this, the law should reflect three factors: the
nature of the boycott, the nature of international trade and the
aspects of boycott participation which are to be proscribed. To the
extent that other factors in the political process influence legisla-
tion, the objective of the law may be obscured. The importance of
a concise and consistent statement of the objectives of a govern-
mental policy is three-fold: first, it guides the implementing agency
in promulgating regulations and identifying violations;
second, it enables businesses to predict administrative enforce-
ment; and third, it requires government to develop consistent
regulatory schemes. This section will review the particular objec-
tives of each antiboycott law, and assess the prospects of their
compatibility within a comprehensive U.S. antiboycott policy.
A. Export Administration Act Amendment of 1977
The EAA, with its broad prohibitions and detailed implementa-
tion, is the focal point in the antiboycott area. However, its objec-
tives are open to different interpretations. The stated legislative
policy is U.S. opposition to foreign boycotts imposed against friend-
ly countries and U.S. persons.' The EAA prohibits U.S. persons
from taking certain actions with intent to comply with, further or
support such boycotts. While the EAA effectively forbids compli-
ance with the secondary and tertiary aspects of a boycott, it permits
activity in compliance with the primary boycott. 5 Congress drew
Restraint, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 769 (1978); Weadon, Bechtel Decree: Antitrust Exposure
Despite Compliance With Other Rules, 3 MIDDLE EAST MONTHLY BOYCOTT L. BULL. 1
(1979).
EAA Sec. 3(5).
The primary boycott seeks to prevent the importation of boycotted country goods or
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this distinction because it recognized the sovereign right of a
country to conduct a boycott within its own territory, but deemed
certain methods of enforcing the boycott intolerable.
-The Commerce Department interpretation of the EAA, as
evidenced by the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)6 and
by the statements of several Commerce officials, follows for the
most part the stated congressional policy, but does differ in some
respects. In response to intense and conflicting lobbying pressure,
the Commerce Department developed what it considered to be a
moderate interpretation of statutory policy The officials often
repeat the theme that "what the law seeks to do... is: (1) prohibit
United States citizens from assuming the responsibility of enforc-
ing foreign boycotts against others, and (2) give all United States
citizens an equal opportunity to participate in boycotting country
markets."' On the whole, Commerce's position is a moderate
balance of opposing views, and its regulations are fairly consistent
with the EAA, although justification for certain interpretations is
needed.9 An indication of the Department's middle of the road
stance is the fact that it has been criticized by some for being too
lenient ° and by others for being unjustifiably restrictive.1'
In contrast to the Commerce .Department's moderate state-
ment of goals are the positions of the two principal lobbies in the
antiboycott area: the Jewish groups"2 and the Business Round-
table. 8 The Jewish groups have the political goal of diminishing
the negative impact of the Arab boycott upon Israel." To achieve
services into the boycotting country, or the export of goods or services from the boycotting
country into the boycotted country. The secondary boycott applies to third country firms,
and seeks to deter them from doing business with the boycotted country. The tertiary
boycott seeks to deter third country firms from doing business with other firms which do
business with the boycotted country. See Marcuss, The Antiboycott Law: The Regulation
of International Business Behavior, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 559, 561 (1978).
15 C.F.R. § 369 et seq. (1978).
See generally Steiner, Pressures and Principles-The Politics of the Antiboycott
Legislation, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 529 (1978).
' Marcuss, supra note 5, at 561.
' See Section II, Subsection A of this Note infra.
" See Kestenbaum, note 3 supra at 803-806. See generally BoYcoTT REPORT Volume 2
(1978) (issued periodically by The American Jewish Congress, Maslow ed.).
" See generally Ludwig and Smith, note 1 supra.
" The American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, and the Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith are the primary Jewish lobbying groups. Steiner, supra
note 7, at 530.
" The Business Roundtable consists of the Chief Executives of approximately 180 com-
panies among the 500 largest U.S. companies. Id
" President Carter said that the purpose of the EAA was to "end the divisive effects on
American life of foreign boycotts aimed at Jewish members of our society." Wall St. J., Jun.
23, 1977 at 3, col. 2.
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this purpose, they have insisted upon the need to prohibit
discrimination against U.S. enterprises which do business with
Israel, and to prohibit discrimination against U.S. persons on the
basis of their race, religion, or national origin.15 The Roundtable, on
the other hand, has pursued an economic goal: while concerned
with protecting U.S. businesses from other businesses which com-
ply with the boycott, it has focused much of its lobbying pressure
on minimizing the impact of the law.16 Both lobbies have expressed
some dissatisfaction with the EAA and the EAR but have agreed
to support renewal of the EAA without revision.
B. Tax Reform Act of 1976
Whereas the EAA is designed to prohibit boycott compliance,
the intent of the TRA is to penalize "participation in or coopera-
tion with international boycotts" (PCIB) by disallowing some tax
benefits normally available to U.S. taxpayers conducting business
abroad.'8 It is often the availability of these tax benefits and incen-
tives to U.S. taxpayers operating abroad that enables firms to
compete with foreign businesses and increase exports. Congress
believed that it was unfair to those taxpayers who refused to par-
ticipate in a boycott, to allow tax benefits to those who do, and
further that many taxpayers would not participate in an interna-
tional boycott if they and foreign countries were aware that tax
benefits were not available to participants." The legislative
history of the TRA exhibits a dual concern for equity and the
discouragement of boycott participation, but contrary to that of the
EAA, expresses little concern for the negative impact of the anti-
boycott law on U.S. businesses.
This sparse expression of legislative purpose presents problems
in determining whether the Treasury Department's Guidelines"
18 196 INT'L TRADE REP. (U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY) (BNA) M-2 (Feb. 28, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as ITEX] (interview with Stanley J. Marcuss, Deputy Asst. Sec. of Commerce).
to Id. at M-2, M-3. See also Rubin, Challenging the Arab Boycott, NATION. September 11,
1976, at 205 (noting the reluctance of business to .eal with these moral issues).
" See Miller, Antiboycott Law Gains Support, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 4.
The Emergency Committee on American Trade, a lobbying group for U.S. exports, plans a
survey of its member corporations concerning the law's impact after the EAR have been in
effect for a longer time.
to See S. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 465-470 (1976) (Conference Committee
Report). See also S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 286-290 (1976) (Sen. Finance Commit-
tee Report), reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3717-3721.
" See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, §§ 1061-1064, 1066, 1067 (1976).
" Department of Treasury Guidelines- Boycott Provisions, 43 Fed. Reg. 3462 (1978)
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are faithful to congressional intent. Most explications of this in-
tent have come from Senator Abraham Ribicoff, the sponsor of the
bill which added the antiboycott provisions to the TRA, in his
criticisms of the Department's Guidelines." Businesses have not
challenged Ribicoff's interpretations of legislative intent, but
rather the propriety of using the tax laws to carry out foreign
policy.' The Guidelines are insulated from any evaluation regard-
ing their fidelity to congressional intent.
C. Antitrust Law: The Bechtel Case"
Whereas the EAA and the TRA are laws which are specifically
designed to prevent U.S. persons from complying with unsanction-
ed international boycotts, antitrust laws have the broader pur-
pose of promoting competition by inhibiting monopolies and other
restraints on trade.' This difference of purpose suggests that anti-
trust litigation will in the long run prove to be an inadequate
means of enforcing a politically oriented antiboycott policy.25 U.S.
v. Bechtel Corp. provides the only indication of the Justice
Department's position regarding foreign boycotts, and this stance
remains unclear.
The charge against Bechtel demonstrates the necessity of a con-
nection between boycott compliance and impact on trade, as
measured by antitrust standards: first, Bechtel was charged with
entry into a combination and conspiracy in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act; second, the terms of the combination and con-
spiracy were alleged to be refusing to deal with blacklisted persons
and requiring others to do likewise; and third, unreasonable ef-
fects of the combination and conspiracy upon U.S. blacklisted per-
[hereinafter cited as Guidelines]. The Guidelines do not have the status of regulations, but
serve as the Department's interpretation of the TRA.
See 205 ITEX A-6, May 2, 1978. Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn) charged that the Treasury
Guidelines regarding letters of credit constituted "a complete evasion of congressional in-
tent." Senator Ribicoff has long sought a "tightening up" of Treasury letter of credit
guidelines. Interview with member of Senator Ribicoff's staff, Washington, February 8,
1979. See also 249 ITEX A-1, March 20, 1979. The Treasury Department plans to issue new
guidelines concerning letters of credit.
"See Miller, note 17 supra.
" U.S. v. Bechtel Corp., Civ. No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976).
L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 14 (1977).
See Rep. of Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, to Accompany S. 69, S.
REP. No. 95-104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 20 (1977) (inadequacy of existing antitrust law).
See also Hearings Before House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 1, 447
(1976) (testimony of Representative Holtzman on ineffectiveness of antitrust law as alter-
native to H.R. 5246, a bill to extend the EAA of 1969).
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sons were alleged. 8 These charges were not litigated, as the case
was resolved pursuant to a consent decree under the Ad-
ministrative Penalties and Procedures Act.2
Although Bechtel is the only antitrust case involving the Arab
boycott, it is useful to consider what tools are at the Justice
Department's disposal for implementing an antiboycott policy.
Two pertinent concepts to be considered are a per se rule of
illegality for boycotts, and the principle of comity.' Such concepts
are likely to underlie, respectively, the arguments of the Justice
Department and a defendant. Justice also might rely on one of
several theories of horizontal and vertical combinations/con-
spiracies to support a charge.' It could also seek to prove par-
ticipation in a combination, a charge especially important for a
general contractor providing pre-award services for a boycotting
country client.8 However, since none of these theories was ad-
judicated in Bechtel, they are of little help as guidelines for
businesses.
If the Justice Department intends to regulate boycott com-
pliance in the future, some guidelines are needed. 81 Bechtel sought
the Department's agreement that the decree represents Depart-
mental policy 2 but an official later claimed that the decree was sui
generis and that the Department was still formulating its policy.
Some indication of that policy is found in the Justice Depart-
ment's Response to Comments (RTC)." Against the charge raised
See Complaint, U.S. v. Bechtel, Civ. No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1976) at §§ VII,
VIII.
'" U.S. v. Bechtel, Civ. No. C-76-99-WAI, (N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1979). See also Antitrust
Penalties and Procedures Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 16 (1979). Bechtel has appealed from entry of
the decree, see note 183 infra.
" For a general discussion of domestic boycotts as per se illegal, see L. SULLIVAN, note 24
supra, at 229-232. For an argument that the per se rule extends to international boycotts,
such as the Arab boycott, see Kestenbaum, Antitrust Implications of the Arab Boycott, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT (N. Vander Clute ed. 1977), at 147. For a definition of
comity see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965).
Kestenbaum, supra note 28, at 150-152.
Id. at 152.
'7 See the Justice Department's Antitrust Guide for International Guidelines, Jan. 26,
1977 [hereinafter cited as Guide]. The Guide contains no example concerning international
boycotts.
I See Record at 48, U.S. v. Bechtel Civ. No. C-76-99-WAI (N.D. Cal., Jan. 16, 1976) (pro-
ceedings before Hon. William A. Ingram, Judge, Sept. 11, 1978).
1 See 218 ITEX N-4 (Aug. 8, 1978) (interview with John Shenefield, Assistant Attorney
General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, Justice Department). Mr. Shenefield also
stated that antitrust law should fill loopholes in the EAA and EAR.
" Justice Department, Responses to Comments, 43 Fed. Reg. 12953 (1978), reprinted in
211 ITEX M-1 (Jun. 13, 1978).
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by the Jewish groups that the decree provided inadequate relief,
the Justice Department responded with three principles: (1) a per-
son subject to U.S. personal jurisdiction may not participate in mak-
ing a boycott decision the effect of which is to injure a U.S. resi-
dent in the flow of U.S. commerce; (2) considerations of comity
limit the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over persons and
conduct beyond U.S. frontiers, especially where there is compul-
sion by a foreign authority acting within its own territory; and (3)
as a corollary to these principles, no person subject to U.S. per-
sonal and subject matter jurisdiction should act as a gatekeeper to
exclude U.S. residents from export business opportunities in
boycotting countries." Thus under principle (1) Bechtel could not
make a boycott decision which affected U.S. persons, but principle
(2) would allow Bechtel to comply with the boycott decisions made
by its clients. Principle (3) is intended to support the proposition
that "it is irrelevant that foreign customers making choices in
foreign lands may accomplish the same ultimate result, so long as
U.S. persons do not themselves participate in the selection pro-
cess. Such conduct would violate the Sherman Act and be offen-
sive to United States public policy.""' The crucial question posed
by Bechtel is whether the Justice Department will adhere to an
antiboycott policy which is derived solely from these antitrust
principles or whether it will harmonize its policy with the EAA.
D. Conclusion
The U.S. response to the Arab boycott is marked by three
distinct sets of objectives: two developed by the legislative branch
through the political process, though in different contexts;7 and
one developed by the Justice Department through its application
of statutes and antitrust principles in one case. Each distinct set
of objectives is implemented by a different agency, resulting in
different regulatory schemes with which businesses must con-
tend.
III. REVIEW OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Before an adequate comparison of the antiboycott laws can be
made, the provisions of each must be examined. This section
' Id at M-1.
n Id
" The EAA was enacted in 1977 after it failed to be passed in 1976. It was widely
debated and has an extensive legislative history. See generally Steiner, note 7 supra. The
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reviews the substantive provisions of the three laws and their im-
plementations, noting the inconsistencies and lack of clarity found
within each law. The problems discussed here are common to
many situations in which a company confronts the difficult task of
interpreting and obeying a particular set of regulations. In this
type of situation, the firm deals with only one agency. The pro-
blems pertaining to multiple agency regulation are discussed in
Sections IV-VI.
A. The Export Administration Act and Export Administration
Regulations.
The EAA provisions dealing with boycotts are divided into six
major sections: jurisdictional requirements," prohibitions," excep-
tions to the prohibitions,' ° evasion,"' reporting requirements,'" and
penalties." The final version of the Export Administration Regula-
tions, promulgated by the Department of Commerce in January
1978, adheres to and elaborates on the EAA provisions."
1. Jurisdictional and Threshold Requirements
There are two jurisdictional requirements and one culpability
standard which must be met before a particular business transac-
tion will fall within the purview of the Act. First, the transaction
must involve a U.S. person; second, the transaction must be in the
interstate or foreign commerce of the United States; and third,
the action must be taken "with intent to comply with, further, or
support any boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign country
against a country which is friendly to the United States.' 5 The
EAR elaborate on these jurisdictional requirements in the Defini-
tions section."
a. U.S. person. A United States person includes all United
States residents, and all foreign subsidiaries, affiliates, or perma-
tax law, in contrast, was enacted largely due to the EAA's failure in 1976, and was a rider
in the comprehensive Tax Reform Act of 1976.
" EAA sec. 4A(aX).
" EAA sec. 4A(aX1XA)-(F).
" EAA sec. 4A(a)(2A-F).
EAA sec. 4A(aX6).
EAA sec. 4A(bX2).
EAA sec. 6.
15 C.F.R. § 369 (1978). The reporting requirements, 15 C.F.R. § 369.6, became effective
Aug. 1, 1978.
" EAA sec. 4A(a)(1).
15 C.F.R. § 369.1.
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nent foreign establishments of domestic concerns which are "con-
trolled in fact" by the domestic concern." "Controlled in fact" will
be presumed under certain circumstances," and means that the
domestic controlling concern has the authority to establish
general policy for, or to control the day-to-day operations of, the
foreign entity."'
b. Interstate or foreign commerce. Transactions which involve
interstate or foreign commerce of the United States include all ac-
tivities of a controlled in fact foreign entity specifically directed
by the domestic concern, 50 or activities between a domestic con-
cern and its controlled in fact foreign entity.5 1 Also included are
transactions between a controlled in fact foreign entity and a per-
son outside the United States, if the transaction involves goods ac-
quired from a United States person for the purpose of filling an
order with the person outside the country.2
c. Intent. Intent to comply with, further, or support an unsanc-
tioned foreign boycott is a necessary element of any violation." In-
tent means "the reason or purpose for one's behavior."N Intent to
comply need not be the sole reason for taking a specific action; if it
is at least one of the reasons for the decision to take a specific ac-
" 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(b).
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2). The presumption arises when (i) the domestic concern benefi-
cialy owns or controls more than 50% of the outstanding voting securities; (ii) the domestic
concern beneficially owns or controls 25% or more the voting securities, if no other person
owns or controls an equal or larger percentage; (iii) the foreign subsidiary or affiliate is
operated by the domestic concern pursuant to the provisions of an exclusive management con-
tract; (iv) a majority of the members of the board of directors of the foreign subsidiary or affili-
ate are also members of the comparable governing body of the domestic concern; (v) the
domestic concern has authority to appoint the majority of the members of the board of direc-
tors; or (vi) the chief operating officer of the foreign subsidiary may be appointed by the
domestic concern. The presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence.
0 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(cXl).
N 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(2).
5 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(dX6).
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(8)(i). In addition, the transaction will be in U.S. commerce if the
goods were purchased for "incorporation into, refining into, reprocessing into or manufac-
ture of another product for the purpose of filling an order from a person outside the United
States," § 369.1(dX8)(ii); or "if the goods or services were acquired for the purpose of fufill-
ing or engaging in any other transaction with a person outside the United States," §
369.1(d)(8Xiii); or "if the goods were acquired and are ultimately used, without substantial
alteration or modification in filling an order from, or filling or engaging in any other trans-
action with, a person outside the United States" § 369.1(d)(8)(iv). Transactions between a
foreign subsidiary or affiliate and a person outside the U.S. will be in U.S. commerce if the
U.S. company provides services to the foreign entity such as technical advice on the trans-
action in question. § 369.1(d) Foreign Subsidiaries, Affiliates, And Other Permanent
Foreign Establishments of Domestic Concerns, Example (xvi).
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e).
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e)4).
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tion, the requisite intent will be found." Actions which happen to
further the boycott but which are not taken with the necessary in-
tent are not prohibited.'
2. Prohibitions
The Act prohibits six distinct activities: (1) refusing, or requir-
ing any other person to refuse to do business with any person in
compliance with the boycott; 7 (2) discriminating against any
business or person on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national
origin;5 (3) furnishing information about any person's race,
religion, six, or national origin;59 (4) furnishing information about
one's business relations with boycotted country firms, or
blacklisted firms;' (5) furnishing information about one's affilia-
tion with, or contributions to a charitable organization which sup-
ports the boycotted country; ' (6) implementing any letter of credit
which violates the rules and regulations promulgated by the Com-
merce Department.2 The discussion of the EAR below focuses on
the prohibitions that tend to create problems for U.S. businesses.
a. Refusals to do business. The prohibition concerning refusals
to do business" protects businesses in both the boycotted country
and in the United States from the effects of the secondary and ter-
tiary aspects of the boycott. The prohibition extends to the U.S.
person's selection of suppliers, parts manufacturers, subcontrac-
tors, and insurers. In addition, it prohibits a U.S. company from
considering the boycott in its decision whether to open a branch
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(eX2). In contrast, a violation of the evasion clause requires that the ac-
tion be taken solely for the purposes of avoiding the application of this part. § 369.4(e).
58 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(eX3). Example (ix) permits a U.S. company to supply information to a
boycotting country about its activities in a boycotted country if the information is supplied
at the U.S. company's initative, and the U.S. company has no intention of terminating or
otherwise changing its relationship with the boycotted country. This example contradicts
the prohibition on providing information to a boycotting country which applies whether the
information is requested by the boycotting country or furnished on the initiative of the U.S.
person. § 369.2(d)(2Xii). Possibly the drafters of the regulations had in mind the content of
the information in permitting the U.S. company to provide information which confirms the
existence of business relations in the boycotted country, but prohibits the furnishing of in-
formation which denies the existence of business relations with the boycotted country.
EAA sec. 4A(a)(1XA).
u EAA sec. 4A(a)(1XB).
EAA sec. 4A(aX1)(C).
EAA sec. 4A(a)(IXD).
61 EAA sec. 4A(a)(1)(E).
EAA sec. 4A(a)(1)(F).
' 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a).
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office in a boycotted country." The prohibition applies to
agreements to refuse to do business as well as actual refusals to
do business."
b. Furnishing information concerning business relations.
The EAR prohibits furnishing information about business rela-
tionships with the boycotted country or with any other person
who is known or believed to be blacklisted." Providing "normal
business information in a commercial context" which is sought
"for a legitimate business purpose" is not proscribed even if the
information could be used for boycott purposes." The distinction
between permissible, or "normal business information," and pro-
hibited information is usually made in the parlance of positive and
negative certifications, respectively. A positive certification
would be a listing of all firms with which a company does
business, whereas a negative certification would be a listing of
firms, such as Israeli firms, with which the company does not do
business. The distinction is largely one of form: its utility as an en-
forcement tool for the Commerce Department rests on the fact
that it is a relatively simple rule for businesses to comply with,
and that positive certifications may impede the Arab League's ef-
fectuation of its boycott.
In addition to the "normal business information" qualification of
the furnishing information prohibition, there are several explicit
exceptions. Providing information in response to import and ship-
ping document requirements is excluded from coverage," as is
providing information about one's own blacklist status (self-
certification)." Furthermore, furnishing information which would
otherwise be prohibited is allowed if the information is supplied
by a bona fide resident in an Arab country who supplies the infor-
mation from his own knowledge, or from sources within the coun-
, 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a), Refusals To Do Business, Example (v).
8 If an invitation to bid from a boycotting country contains a clause which states that the
bidder must not deal with companies on the blacklist, acceptance of a U.S. company's bid
constitutes an agreement to refuse to do business. § 369.2(a), Agreements to Refuse To Do
Business, Example (ii). This example has been criticized as being inconsistent with the
policy of the EAR to encourage reformation of documents. Ludwig & Smith, supra note 1,
at n. 142.
15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d). The prohibition also applies to information concerning business
relationships with any business concern organized under the laws of a boycotted country,
and with any national or resident of a boycotted country. § 369.2(dXl).
" 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(dX4).
" 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(b).
" 15 C.F.R. § 369 Appendix Interpretation. See also Ludwig & Smith, supra note 1, at
nn.107-08.
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A significant problem with the furnishing information rules is
determining what kinds of information, other than the straightfor-
ward positive certification, fall within the "normal business"
qualification. On this issue the EAR examples obfuscate rather
than illustrate what information may be supplied. For instance, a
U.S. company may supply a copy of its annual report to a boycot-
ting country despite the fact that it may contain all the informa-
tion needed to determine whether it has business relations with
blacklisted firms or in the boycotted country. 1 Yet the regulations
explicitly prohibit the furnishing of the same information in
response to an explicit boycott request. Liability appears to turn
on the label which the boycotting country customer affixes to his re-
quest, and on his intent. A U.S. company will have difficulty discer-
ning the intent of a boycotting country customer who will couch
the request in non-boycott terms in light of these regulations. Fur-
thermore, the Regulations do not indicate whether the request
must be motivated solely by boycott purposes for the prohibition
to apply, or whether a request which is in part motivated by
boycott purposes is sufficient to trigger the prohibition.
d. Letters of credit. The EAR prohibit a U.S. bank from im-
plementing letters of credit (LOCs) which contain a condition or
requirement which, if complied with, would violate one of the pro-
hibitions." This prohibition has an additional jurisdictional re-
quirement-the "commerce-plus test:"7' the transaction to which
the letter of credit applies must be in U.S. interstate or foreign
commerce, and the beneficiary must be a U.S. person. 5 The
beneficiary is presumed not to be a U.S. person if his address is
not in the United States, but the presumption can be rebutted if
the bank knew or should have known that the beneficiary is a U.S.
person. In addition, the transaction will be presumed not be in
U.S. commerce if the letter of credit calls for documents indicating
shipment of foreign-origin goods from foreign ports. 6
70 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-) Examples (iii), (iv), (v).
71 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d), Example (ii).
15 C.F.R. § 369.2(dX4).
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f).
15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(6)-(10).
15 C.F.R. § 369.2(fX6).
" 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(7)-(10). The fact that these presumptions are rebuttable requires the
banks to look beyond the face of the document. The examples provide no help in determin-
ing what facts will be sufficient to rebut the presumption absent actual knowledge that the
beneficiary is a U.S. person despite his foreign address, or that the transaction is in U.S.
-ommerce despite documentation of foreign origin goods.
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Fairly clear rules are provided to banks by the EAR, and ex-
cept for some confusion immediately following the promulgation
of final regulations, banks have been able to comply without much
difficulty. A minor problem has arisen concerning the Commerce
Department's interpretation of the self-certification rule. The
Department has stated that self-certifications can be voluntarily
furnished by the beneficiary, but a bank may not require a self-
certification, as this amounts to a refusal to do business. Banks
are placed in an awkward position by this interpretation: a
beneficiary could require the bank to honor the LOC regardless of
the certificate he furnishes (unless it was a negative certificate
regarding a third party), since honoring the LOC would be legal
under U.S. law. However, if the beneficiary chose to give a cer-
tificate which did not conform to the conditions of the LOC, the
Arab bank paying under the Letter could refuse to do so because
of the U.S. bank's failure to present the required documents. The
Arab bank's refusal to pay under an improperly documented LOC
would be in accordance with international LOC rules."
3. Exceptions to the Prohibitions
The exceptions in the EAA recognize the validity of an interna-
tional primary boycott78 by permitting the following activities: (1)
complying with the boycotting country's requirements prohibiting
the importation of goods made in the boycotted country, and with
the boycotting country's shipping route requirements; 79 (2) com-
plying with the boycotting country's import and shipping docu-
ment requirements;w (3) complying with the unilateral and specific
selection by a boycotting country resident of insurers, suppliers,
and shippers;" (4) complying with the boycotting country's export
requirements;" (5) complying with the boycotting country's im-
migration requirements;" (6) complying with the local laws of the
boycotting country."
a. Import Requirements of a Boycotting Country. The import
" See 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f), Letters of Credit, Example (xiv), for The Commerce Dep't.'s in-
terpretation. For an excellent discussion of the problems with this interpretation, see
Ludwig & Smith, note 1 supr, at 251-252.
" See note 5 supra.
" EAA see. 4A(aX2XA).
" EAA see. 4A(aX2XB).
EAA sec. 4A(aX2XC).
" EAA see. 4A(aX2D).
0 EAA sec. 4A(aX2XE).
" EAA sec. 4A(aX2XF).
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requirement exception" permits a U.S. person to comply with the
boycotting country's requirements which restrict imports from
the boycotted country. However, the prohibitions against issuing
negative certificates of origin" and furnishing information about
business relationships with boycotted countries or blacklisted per-
sons8 7 still apply."
b. Import and shipping documentation. The prohibition on fur-
nishing information does not apply to the boycotting country's im-
port and shipping documentation requirements." Information may
be provided with respect to the country of origin, the name of the
carrier, the route of shipment, the name of the supplier of the
shipment and the name of the provider of other services.
However, the information must be furnished in positive terms,"
except for the name for the carrier and the route of shipment,
which can be stated in negative terms in order to comply with
precautionary requirements for war risks or confiscation.91
c. Unilateral and specific selection. The unilateral and specific
selection exception" and the local law exception" apply to both
the refusal to do business and the furnishing of information pro-
hibitions. A U.S. person may comply with the selection made by a
resident of the boycotting country of carriers, insurers, and sup-
pliers of services or goods. In order to comply with the selection
of services, the U.S. person must establish that the service is
customarily performed in the boycotting country. With respect to
the selection of component parts, the goods must be identifiable as
to their source of origin." The EAR explicitly allow to U.S. person
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-1).
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(bX2).
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d).
" 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-IX3).
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(b).
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(bX2).
" Id. The regulations do not permit a U.S. company to certify "goods will not be shipped
on a carrier that is ineligible to enter the boycotting country's waters." This negative cer-
tification is not a reasonable requirement to protect against war risks or confiscation. §
369.3(b), Examples of Compliance with Import and Shipping Document Requirements,
Example (vii).
Since a U.S. person is permitted to select a shipper from among those who are eligible to
enter boycotting country's waters, 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a), Refusals to Do Business, Example
(iv), the result is that the U.S. person may make a selection in compliance with the boycott,
but may not directly tell the boycotting country that it has done so. The same anomaly ex-
ists with 'respect to furnishing information in compliance with local law. See Ludwig &
Smith, note 1 supra, at 263.
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c).
" 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f).
" 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(cX16). The goods must be identifiable by "(a) uniqueness of design or
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to make the selection on a boycott basis if he is a bona fide resi-
dent of the boycotting country." Factors which will be considered
in determining the bona fides of residency emphasize the nature
and purpose of the presence of the U.S. person in the boycot-
ting country." Businesses may be unable to invoke this exception
in light of Bechtel, as discussed in Section IV.
d. Local law exception. There are two parts to this exception,
both of which relate to the activites of a bona fide resident of a
boycotting country." The first part covers activities performed
exclusively within the boycotting country." The second part
covers the importation of goods by a bona fide resident of the
boycotting country." In compliance with local law, the resident
may perform any act which would otherwise be prohibited under
the EAR except for discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
sex, or national origin.'"0 The local law exception does not apply to
the importation of services,'"' and with respect to the importation
of goods, the goods must not only be identifiable' ° but must also
be for the resident's "own use or for his use in performing con-
tractual services" within the boycotting country.'03 Many transac-
tions will be covered by both the unilateral and specific selection
exception and the local law exception. It has been argued that the
local law exception limits the unilateral and specific selection ex-
ception where the two exceptions overlap, because of the local law
exception's "own use" requirement, and the exclusion of services
from the scope of that exception. 104
appearance; or (b) trademark, trade name, or other identification normally on the items
themselves."
" 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(cX7).
" 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(8). The factors are (i) physical presence in the country; (ii) whether
residence is needed for legitimate business reasons; (iii) continuity of the residence; (iv) in-
tent to maintain the residence; (v) prior residence in the country; (vi) size and nature of
presence in the country; (vii) whether the person is registered to do business or incor-
porated in the country; (viii) whether the person has a valid work visa; and (ix) whether the
person has a simliar presence in both boycotting and non-boycotting foreign countries in
connection with similar business activities.
'" The factors used to determine the bona fides of residence are the same as those ap-
plied for the unilateral and specific selection exception, supra note 96.
15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-1).
15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2).
15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2)(10).
01 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2)(8). This has been criticized as contrary to congressional intent.
Ludwig & Smith, supra note 1, at 257-258.
'" The test of identifiability is the same as that used for the unilateral and specific selec-
tion, supra note 94.
'u 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2)(1)(i). "For one's own use" is elaborated in § 369.3(f-2X6).
The interplay between these exceptions is thoroughly examined in Ludwig & Smith,
19791
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4. Evasion
The broadly worded evasion clause of the EAA 15 proscribes
any act or transaction undertaken with the intent to evade the
provisions of the EAA or the implementing regulations. The
Regulations1" provide three examples of evasion: (1) the use of an
artifice or scheme .which places a person at a commercial disad-
vantage because he is blacklisted,1  (this includes the use of a risk-
of-loss provision that imposes a financial risk on another because of
the import laws of a boycotting country);1" (2) the use of a dummy
corporation to "mask prohibited activity;"1" and (3) the diversion
of "specific boycotting country orders from a United States parent
to a foreign subsidiary for purposes of complying with prohibited
boycott requirement." The extensive use of exceptions is not
evasion per se, but if a U.S. company establishes a local branch in
a boycotting country solely for the purpose of invoking the
unilateral and specific selection exception or local law exception, it
will be evasion."' Individual transactions which have the effect of
avoiding the prohibitions will not constitute evasion "so long as
the [transaction] is based on legitimate business considerations
and is not undertaken solely to avoid the application of the pro-
hibitions. ' ""
supra note 1, at 255 et seq. The writers argue that if both exceptions are applicable to a
given transaction, the most restrictive test will be applied. Thus, if a U.S. person who is a
bona fide resident of a boycotting country makes a unilateral and specific selection, the im-
plementing person should not carry out the selection "if the selection does not meet the
'own use' requirement of the local law import compliance exception, and he should not carry
out a selection of supplier of services to be performed in whole or in part in the boycotting
country." Ludwig & Smith, supra note 1, at 259. Such a pessimistic reading is unnecessary:
the EAR do not demand that the requirements of all exceptions be met before any one can
be used.
10 EAA sec. 4A(aX6).
106 15 C.F.R. § 396.4.
15 C.F.R. § 396.4(c).
10 15 C.F.R. § 396.4(d). This is a presumption which can be rebutted by showing that the
provision is customary for both boycotting and non-boycotting countries and that there is a
legitimate non-boycott reason for its use.
10 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(e).
110 Id
... 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 Example (vi). This example involves a company which does have
other legitimate business reasons for establishing a bona fide residence, but implies that ab-
sent such reasons the activity would constitute evasion. Arguably, this will relate to the
bona fides of residence, supra note 96, rather than evasion.
1" § 369.4(e) (emphasis supplied). Several of the examples illustrate this point, e.g., exam-
ple (i) (changing annual report which is sent to potential Arab customer as a means of fur-
nishing information); (ii) (requesting a supplier of goods to label his goods in order to satisfy
the identifiably requirement of the local law exception).
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Interestingly, the evasion examples distinguish between the
diversion of purchase orders to a foreign subsidiary in order to
remove a transaction from U.S. commerce"' and the decision by a
foreign subsidiary to expand its market to the boycotting country
after the U.S. parent determined it could no longer do business
there because of the EAR."' While the former action constitutes
evasion, the latter does not. Thus, the diversion of an entire
market to a foreign subsidiary is permitted, while the diversion of
a single transaction is proscribed. The Department's explanation
for the market diversion example is that there is a legitimate
business reason for the actions of the parent and subsidiary. For
the reasons to be legitimate, it must be assumed that the parent,
when it terminated business in the boycotting country, did not in-
tend for the subsidiary to pick up its lost business. It is the
absence of independent decision making in the purchase order ex-
ample which renders that action evasive.'
5. Reporting Requirements
The Act requires U.S. persons to report to the Department of
Commerce any request for the furnishing of boycott information,
or for taking action in support of the boycott."' The report must
indicate whether the U.S. person intends to comply with the re-
quest. The Regulations make it clear that reports of requests
must be filed regardless of whether the action requested is pro-
hibited or permissible under the EAR."7 Thus, if a boycotting
country makes a unilateral and specific selection on a boycott
basis, the implementing U.S. company must report this action if it
has reason to know that the selection was made on the basis of a
blacklist."' Since a boycotting country customer would rarely
choose a blacklisted supplier, the reporting requirement applies to
virtually all unilateral and specific selections.
'1, 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 Example (viii).
"' 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 Example (vii).
Of course, if the goods are manufactured in the U.S. and diverted to a foreign sub-
sidiary for subsequent sale to a boycotting country, this would constitute evasion, since the
intent is to avoid the U.S. commerce test. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 Example (iv).
EAA sec. 4A(bX2).
II? 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a1). A subsequent section exempts seven types of requests from the
reporting requirement. § 369.6(aX5).
"I C.F.R. § 369.6 Example (ii). Other Examples which require a request to be reported
despite the legality of taking the requested action are (i) request to self-certify and (v)
unilateral and specific selection.
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The Export Administration Act of 1969 also had a reporting re-
quirement.119 Congress found that the implementing regulations"2
were too vague and did not require a U.S. company to indicate
whether it would comply with the request.'1 In response, the
EAR require all U.S. companies to report whether they have
taken or intend to take the requested action."2
6. Conclusion
The EAR are comprehensive and reasonably clear. Many fine
distinctions are drawn which reflect opposing lobbying pressures
on the Commerce Department. Concessions to business such as
allowing self-certifications,'s allowing the furnishing of informa-
tion which is not in response to an express boycott request, 2' and
the commerce-plus test for letters of credit" are balanced by con-
cessions to the Jewish groups such as limiting the local law excep-
tion to goods,'" prohibiting an invitation to bid on a contract
which has a boycott clause,'" and requiring banks to look beyond
the face of a letter of credit document to determine jurisdiction. 8
The extent to which the evasion clause has an in terrorem ef-
fect on business will depend on how rigorously the Commerce
Department analyzes other legitimate business reasons for taking
an action which avoids the prohibitions. Clarification of the ac-
tivities constituting evasion is necessary.
The EAA could effectively deter compliance with the more in-
tolerable aspects of an international boycott. Unfortunately for
business, it is only one of the laws with which businesses must con-
tend.
B. Tax Reform Act of 1976 and Treasury Guidelines
The antiboycott provisions of the TRA provides two methods
50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b)(1) (1976).
15 C.F.R. § 369.4 (1977).
13 SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOR. COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss. THE ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, 26 (Sub-
comm. Print 1976).
15 C.F.R. § 369.6(dX6).
" See text at note 69 supra. This concession, as well as those in notes 124-128 infra, are
not statutorily required.
"s See text at note 71 supra.
13 See text at note 74 supra.
See text at note 101 supra.
See text at note 65 supra.
1 See text at note 77 supra.
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for deterring boycott compliance: first, a broad reporting require-
ment gathers data on all U.S. persons conducting business in Arab
countries, whether they receive tax benefits or not;'9 and second,
the statute penalizes boycott compliance by the withdrawal of
three types of tax benefits. 130
1. Reporting Requirement
U.S. taxpayers are required to report (a) all operations in or
related to any country included in the Treasury Secretary's
boycotting country list; (b) operations in or related to a country,
not on the list, but which the U.S. taxpayer knows or has reason
to know requires PCIB as a condition of doing business; and (c)
any requests received for PCIB, and if received, the nature of the
operation involved and whether or not there was PCIB. 3' Repor-
ting requirements apply to all U.S. persons who have operations
described by (a) and (b) whether or not they receive tax benefits."
Willful failure to report can result in stiff penalties. "
2. Denial of Tax Benefits
A taxpayer who agrees to engage in PCIB is denied the follow-
ing tax benefits with respect to boycott related income: (1) credits
for foreign taxes paid;'" (2) deferral of U.S. taxation on earnings of
controlled foreign corporations;'m and (3) deferral of U.S. taxation
of the earnings of a Domestic International Sales Corporation
(DISC).1 Loss of tax benefits can be mitigated in two ways. The
taxpayer can choose to apply the International Boycott Factor
(IBF),13 7 or the specific attribution of taxes and income method." If
the IBF is chosen, the taxpayer can demonstrate that some opera-
tions are clearly separable from the boycotting operation, and
specifically attribute taxes paid and income earned in connection
with those separate operations, thereby excluding them from the
I.R.C. § 999(aXI).
" I.R.C. § 999(c).
13 I.R.C. § 999(aXI).
In I.R.C. § 999(aX1). Operations in or related to a boycotting country provide a sufficient
ground for the reporting requirement. See note 226 infra.
" I.R.C. § 999(f).
U I.R.C. § 908(a).
- I.R.C. § 952(aX3).
In I.R.C. § 995(bXMF). For a discussion of the merits of Domestic International Sales Cor-
porations, see Note, Tax Incentives to Exportation: Alternatives to DISC, at 413 infra.
"I I.R.C. § 999(cX1).
" I.R.C. § 999(cX2).
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IBF.'"
The statute penalizes "participation in or cooperation with in-
ternational boycotts" (PCIB), which is defined as an agreement
made as a condition of doing business directly or indirectly with
or within a boycotting country. A PCIB agreement is one to
refrain from doing business with or in the boycotted country or
with its government, nationals or companies;" to refrain from do-
ing business with any U.S. person"1 who is engaged in trade with
the boycotted country;" 2 to refrain from doing business with any
company whose ownership is comprised of individuals of a par-
ticular nationality, race or religion;4 3 to remove or refrain from
selecting directors1" or to refrain from employing individuals,"6
for reason of race, religion, or nationality; or to refrain from ship-
ping or insuring goods on a blacklisted carrier as a condition of the
sale of a product to a boycotting person. "8 The only exceptions to
the prohibition against PCIB concern compliance with boycotts
which are sanctioned by the United States17 and compliance with
a boycotting country's prohibitions on the import or export of
goods produced in or sent to a boycotted country.'"
The class of taxpayers who could lose their tax benefits is
broadly defined to include all members of a controlled group, "9 or
I.R.C. § 999(cXl). Temporary Treasury Regulation § 7.999-1 specifies that the
numerator and denominator of the IBF are determined on the basis of three factors: pur-
chases, sales, and payroll.
1,0 I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(i).
I.R.C. § 999(aX3). "U.S. person" includes U.S. citizens, residents, corporations, partner-
ships, trusts, and estates (see I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)).
"' I.R.C. § 999(bU)(A)(iii).
"' I.R.C. § 999(b)3)(A)(ii).
'" I.R.C. § 999(b3MA)(iii).
I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(AXiv).
I.R.C. § 999(bX3XB).
,7 I.R.C. § 999(bX4)(A).
-- I.R.C. § 999(bX4)(B), (C).
"I I.R.C. § 999(a). "Controlled group" is defined in I.R.C. § 1563(a), as modified by §
999(aX3). There are two kinds of controlled groups: parent-subsidiary and brother-sister
groups. A parent-subsidiary controlled group consists of a chain of corporations where
more than 50% of the voting power or of the total value of the stock of each corporation is
owned, directly or through an option, by one or more of the other corporations. Parent-
subsidiary groups also include groups where a common parent owns, directly or through an
option, more than 50% of the voting power or of the total value of the stock of one or more
members of the group.
A brother-sister controlled group exists where five or fewer individuals, trusts, or
estates own, directly or constructively under I.R.C. § 1563(e), more than 50% of the voting
power or of the total value of the stock of each corporation in the group, where only the
lowest percentages of stock ownership of each person in any of the corporations is con-
sidered. See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) and (d)(2). One writer has pointed out the lack of clarity
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all related persons. '5 There is a presumption that all members of
a controlled group and all related persons are involved in PCIB if
other members or related persons are involved,151 but the
presumption can be rebutted by a clear demonstration that the
operations sought to be exonerated are clearly separate and iden-
tifiable and did not engage in PCIB. 1'
Treasury Department enforcement" of the TRA focues on
agreements to engage in PCIB.'" The Department's Guidelines
cover express agreements, written or oral, 1 5  and implied
agreements, which may be inferred from an overall course of con-
duct." Express agreements to engage in PCIB trigger tax
penalties even though execution of the agreement deviates from
its terms,57 or the agreement was not made with intent to engage
in PCIB.'5 The only real limit, therefore, to Treasury enforcement
is that all charges of PCIB must relate to an agreement.
3. Problem Areas
There are four troublesome areas in the Guidelines: (a) the
course of conduct inference; (b) the relation back concept in letter
of credit transactions; (c) the furnishing of information provisions;
which results from the TRA's application of the attribution tests of § 1563, which
heretofore applied only to domestic groups, to foreign corporations. BNA Portfolio, supra
note 2, at A-17.
15 I.R.C. § 999(e). I.R.C. § 304(c) defines a related person as one who owns, directly or by
means of § 318 attribution, at least 50% of the total combined voting power or total value of all
the stock of a corporation, or has such a percentage of ownership of a corporation which in turn
has that percentage of ownership of another corporation. This definition of "related person"
can extend the presumption of PCIB to corporations which are related to other corpora-
tions or persons to an extent less than a controlled group. It has been pointed out that the
method of application of § 318 attribution rules to foreign corporations is far from clear.
BNA Portfolio, supra note 2, at A-17.
151 I.R.C. §§ 999(b)(1); 999(b)(2)(A), (B); 999(e)(1), (2).
rn Id The presumption applies only to operations in or with the boycotting country, not
to operations related to the country.
' See S. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 465, 467 (1976). See also BNA Portfolio,
supra note 2, at A-6.
154 I.R.C. § 999(bX3).
' , Guidelines H-lA.
1 See (g) of the Preamble to the Guidelines:
where the action described in the question by itself does not, according to the
answer, provide sufficient evidence to support an inference that an agreement
under section 999(b)(3) exists, an overall course of conduct which includes such ac-
tion in addition to other factors could support such an inference; whether an
agreement can be inferred from a given course of conduct is an evidentiary ques-
tion which turns on the probative value of particular facts and circumstances.
"' Guidelines H-18.
' , Guidelines 1-4.
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and (d) the provisions regarding selection of subcontractors.
a. Course of conduct inference. Even when an agreement
falls within a given exception, PCIB can be inferred from the
parties' course of conduct. There are three situations where per-
missible conduct comes under scrutiny:'59 (1) where a taxpayer
enters an express agreement which is allowed but which contains
a questionable clause' which may, in effect, advance the boycott;
(2) where an express agreement is allowed but there is conduct
which is at the same time consistent with the boycott'' (such as ter-
mination of business with Israel soon after making an agreement
in an Arab country); and (3) where there is no agreement but a
person indicates that he would have entered into one which con-
tained a questionable clause"2 (e.g., a contractor in its tender in-
dicates that it would sign a contract which would amount to
PCIB). The course of conduct inference is similar to the evasion
clause of the EAA since both can trigger penalties for activity not
expressly prohibited. However, while the evasion clause is con-
tained in a statute, the course of conduct inference is purely a
creation of the Treasury Department.'
b. Relation back. The relation back concept applies to letter of
credit (LOC) transactions. If a taxpayer enters into a legal con-
tract but a subsequent LOC contains a boycott requirement, the
requirement relates back to the original contract and becomes
part of it, with the result that fulfillment of the requirement con-
stitutes an express PCIB agreement.'" This concept allows
Treasury to regulate LOCs.
The relation back concept has been obscured by a recent IRS
Letter Ruling 6 ' which allowed a beneficiary of a LOC to comply
with the LOC boycott requirement because the beneficiary had
made a good faith effort during negotiation of the contract to in-
,' BNA Portfolio, supra note 2, at A-9, A-10.
' See Guidelines H-3, H-7, H-13, H-14, H-15.
"e See Guidelines H-5, H-9, H-23, M-8.
" See Guidelines H-24.
"' See note 156 supra.
16 Guidelines H-8. It is not clear to which operations the penalties will apply: operations
which are the subject of the original contract or the separate and identifiable operations
relating to the LOC or the actual contract negotiations. Cf Guideline D-3(f), which enables
banks to set up their LOC services as operations which are separate and identifiable from
their other international banking and financing services. It appears that other businesses
too may be able to minimize tax penalties by separating their operations with respect to
LOCs.
1" IRS Private Letter Ruling on Boycott Terms in Letter of Credit, reprinted in 228
ITEX N-i, Oct. 17, 1978.
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sure that the requirement would not appear in the LOC. The
beneficiary who sought the ruling had included a clause in the
original contract which required that the LOC be in conformity
with the contract, but believed that despite its efforts the LOC
would contain a boycott requirement. The IRS stated that the
non-conforming LOC constitued a breach of the original contract
and therefore was not a condition of doing business. Compliance
with the requirement was allowed, on the condition that the
beneficiary's good faith efforts continued through the time when
final arrangements were made for carriage of goods to the
destination. There was no explanation why an inference of a PCIB
agreement should not be drawn from this conduct;' the IRS
merely warned that consistent failure to obtain conforming LOCs
would violate § 999.1"7 The Letter Ruling is a judicious analysis of
the given set of facts, but confuses the rules concerning LOCs and
course of conduct inferences.
c. Furnishing information. The Guidelines generally allow a
U.S. taxpayer to furnish information to a boycotting country. Fur-
nishing information about one's business relations with blacklisted
persons is permitted because it is not a PCIB agreement,"' although
it could lead to the inference of an implied agreement to engage in
PCIB.6 9 The Guidelines permit negative certification concerning
goods, sellers, and suppliers, but for no clear reason prohibit cer-
tification that no boycotted country capital was used to produce
goods.Y° This last prohibition could, depending on the wording of
the request, prevent the giving of the other permitted type of
negative certification. 1
The Treasury Department apparently has adopted an informal
rule that self-certification, or agreement to do so, is PCIB, on the
theory that it is an agreement not to become blacklisted.'72 This
'1 See note 156 and accompanying text supra. An inference of an implied PCIB agree-
ment can be made where there is an allowable express agreement but where there is con-
duct which is consistent with the boycott.
16 See Guidelines H-3 (repeated inclusion of provision that local law will apply does
not give rise to inference); and H-32 (repeated supplying of import certificates that goods
were not manufactured by person engaged in trade in boycotted country does not by itself
constitute PCIB agreement).
16 Guidelines H-17.
Id. See also Guidelines H-32 (agreement to provide negative certification is prohibited,
whereas repetitive provision of such certification is permitted).
171 Guidelines 1-4.
11 E.g., if the request combined two questions: "Were these goods made in Israel or with
Israeli capital?"
"7, Bricker, supra note 2, at 291. The Treasury Department has written new, more
restrictive LOC Guidelines which may involve the furnishing of information. The Guide-
lines await the Secretary's approval. See 249 ITEX A-i, March 20, 1978.
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rule is consistent with some of the Guidelines;"' but inconsistent
with the Guidelines concerning the furnishing of information.
There is no reason why self-certification, but not negative cer-
tification, should constitute PCIB.
d. Selection of subcontractors. A contractor's ability to select
subcontractors is sketched out in the Guidelines, but the vague-
ness of the rules masks the risk of tax penalties. The Guidelines
permit contracts containing clauses which: (1) give the boycotting
country right of prior approval of all subcontractors;17" ' and (2) give
the contractor the right to disapprove any subcontractor proposed
by the boycotting country.7 5 Regarding the latter clause, the
Guidelines state that the contractor has the right of disapproval
even though the boycotting country makes proposals based on a
blacklist. This situation may give rise to antitrust problems, as
discussed in subsection C. below.
Two problems arising under the tax rules on subcontractor ap-
proval are apparent here. First, an inference of an implied PCIB
agreement may still be made with regard to either type of con-
tract.7 6 For example, one Guideline states that the inference could
be made if the contract specifies a number of subcontractors, none
of which are blacklisted, where the contractor knows that both
the listed and omitted companies are capable.'77 Second, it is not
clear whether the contractor is under a duty to inquire about the
boycotting country's blacklist. One Guideline, referring to all com-
panies, presumably including contractors, would allow parties to
sign a contract requiring them to refrain from using certain sub-
contractors which the boycotting country alleges to be blacklisted
for non-boycott reasons, but is silent on the contractor's duty of
17 E.g., H-29A (bank confirming LOC which contains blacklist self-certification is a PCIB
agreement); H-34 (self-certification by component supplier is a PCIB agreement); K-5 (cer-
tification in LOC that beneficiary's board of directors has no boycotted country nationals is
a PCIB agreement).
',' Guidelines H-13.
178 Guidelines H-15.
' Guidelines H-13, H-15. Compare Guidelines H-14 (contract which on its face indicates a
pattern of exclusion of certain companies).
'" Guidelines H-14. But cf. Guidelines J-10 (permits a contract in which the component
supplier is named and where the boycotting country's import laws prohibit the importation
of goods manufactured by blacklisted companies). In J-10 no inference of a PCIB agreement
will be made "solely from a provision.., that goods or components must be produced by a
specific company that does not in fact appear on the blacklist."
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inquiry into the basis for the country's assertion.' Silence creates
some difficulty, such as when a contract contains clause (2) men-
tioned above, giving the contractor a right to disapprove of sub-
contractors submitted by the boycotting country. Can an infer-
ence of PCIB be made in cases where the contractor has right of
disapproval, and where the country submits a list of firms with
the explanation that omitted firms were blacklisted on a non-boy-
cott basis? Does the contractor's right of disapproval entail a duty
to inquire into whether omitted companies are competent, or into
the basis for the country's claim that it used a non-boycott black-
list? There is tension between the rule holding the contractor
liable for agreeing to a contract which specifies certain subcon-
tractors and excludes others known to be capable, and the rule
allowing the contractor to sign a contract requiring it to refrain
from selecting certain subcontractors, in reliance on the country's
assurances. What must the contractor know, and what can it do?
4. Summary
Underlying all four areas discussed above is the problem that
charges of PCIB must be related to an agreement. A flawed set of
rules has resulted. There exist an omnipresent threat of an infer-
red agreement; an obscure relation back concept for LOCs; an in-
consistent set of furnishing information provisions; and unclear
rules regarding the selection of subcontractors. The objective of
deterring boycott compliance by means of tax penalties has been
undermined by the vague and confused Guidelines.
C. Antitrust Law
1. The Bechtel Decree
The Justice Department brought antitrust law to bear upon
boycotts with its suit against Bechtel, filed prior to the enactment
of the TRA and EAA.' 9 The suit charged that Bechtel
unreasonably restrained foreign and interstate commerce in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act by its enforcement of the Arab boycott
against its subcontractors."8 ' A consent decree was negotiated
pursuant to the Antitrust Penalties and Procedures Act (APPA)'8'
and, after review by the district court, was filed as a final judg-
Guidelines J-1.
See note 23 supm
' See Complaint, supra note 23, at § vii.
"' 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1979).
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ment, almost three years after the initiation of negotiations.182
Bechtel, disagreeing with the court's interpretation of the decree,
has since appealed the judgment filed by the court."
The decree applies to Bechtel with respect to its role as a prime
contractor on any major construction project and regulates the
business relations between Bechtel, its clients, and subcontractors
by means of a system of injunctions and exceptions. Three specific
actions are covered: Bechtel's alleged refusal to deal, specific and
unilateral selection by Bechtel's client, and solicitation by Bechtel
of bids from subcontractors.
a. Refusals to deal, Bechtel is enjoined from performing any
provision of a contract which requires that it boycott or refuse to
deal with any U.S. blacklisted subcontractor; from requiring any
other person to boycott or refuse to deal with such subcontractor;
and from performing any provision of a contract which requires
that any other person boycott or refuse to deal with such subcon-
tractor.'" There are two exceptions to these injunctions. First,
Bechtel may enter into a contract outside the U.S. which requires
that it abide by the laws of the country in which the project is
located.'" This exception allows Bechtel to comply with Arab law
regarding any contract provision other than one requiring it to
boycott a U.S. blacklisted person. Second, Bechtel may boycott
non-U.S. blacklisted persons.'" The exceptions allow Bechtel to
comply with local law in boycotting subcontractors, but not U.S.
blacklisted subcontractors. 87
b. Specific and unilateral selection. The decree also enjoins
Bechtel from serving as an agent for a client in order to perform
in the U.S. a provision of a contract which provides that the client
boycott or refuse to deal with any U.S. blacklisted
subcontractor."' However, Bechtel may purchase for its client
goods or services produced in the U.S. by a subcontractor who
has been specifically and unilaterally selected by the client,
whether or not the selection was boycott based.'89 Similarly,
where the client has independently purchased the goods and ser-
1K See note 23 supra.
1S See 248 ITEX A-i (Mar. 13, 1979).
IM U.S. v. Bechtel, Civ. No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal., Jan.'16, 1976) at IV(A), (B), (C).
Id at V(A).
Id at V(B).
"s See Justice Department RTC, supra note 34, at M-2.
See U.S. v. Bechtel, Civ. No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 16, 1976) at IV(E).
Id at V(C).
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vices from subcontractors, whether or not on a boycott basis,
Bechtel may work on the project. On the other hand, its work may
not include inspecting a subcontractor with the U.S. to determine
its blacklist status.'19 Thus Bechtel is prohibited from serving as
an agent of its client when the client boycotts U.S. blacklisted sub-
contractors, but is permitted to comply with any specific and uni-
lateral selection of subcontractors by the client, even if the selec-
tion is boycott based.
c. Solicitation of bids from subcontractors. The narrow
specific and unilateral selection exception requires a precise
definition of the permissible roles of Bechtel and its client in
soliciting bids from subcontractors. Bechtel is enjoined from fail-
ing to recommend any person because it is a U.S. blacklisted per-
son, from excluding any person from a list of possible subcontrac-
tors because it is a U.S. blacklisted person, and from excluding
any person from the list of those from whom bids are solicited
because it is a U.S. blacklisted person. 9' There is also an injunc-
tion against selecting, recommending, or soliciting bids from sub-
contractors from a list provided by the client if Bechtel knows or
has reason to believe that any person was excluded from the list
because it was a U.S. blacklisted person.'" Finally, there are in-
junctions against maintaining a blacklist in the U.S. and against
using a blacklist outside the U.S. for any specifically prohibited
purpose. '93
There is an exception which allows Bechtel to use competitive
bidding by issuing invitations to subcontractors, including, but not
limited to, those proposed by the client. Bechtel may also recom-
mend subcontractors to the client, provided the client makes an
independent selection. However, Bechtel's recommendation may
not be based on the blacklist status of subcontractors.'1
The effect of the decree is to prevent Bechtel from directly
boycotting U.S. blacklisted subcontractors. Bechtel may only
boycott non-U.S. subcontractors. It may not serve as its client's
agent in selecting subcontractors where the client is using a
blacklist, but it may comply with any boycott based selection of
the client which is specific and unilateral. Bechtel may also pro-
vide the clients with normal pre-award services: selecting subcon-
tractors, recommending subcontractors, and soliciting bids from
Id. at V(D).
U Id at IV(F).
,"Id at IV(G).
, Id at IV(H).
' Id at V(E).
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subcontractors, as long as it does not use a blacklist of U.S. sub-
contractors.
2. Bechtel's Appeal
During the decree review and comment period, allowed under
the APPA, a disagreement between Bechtel and the Justice
Department arose over the decree's meaning. This lead Bechtel to
oppose its entry as final judgment.19 5 The disagreement involved
three issues: (1) whether the consent decree represented the
Department's policy on foreign boycotts; (2) whether the Depart-
ment would restrict its enforcement to exclude actions taken within
foreign countries; and (3) what kind of modification of the decree
Bechtel could obtain.1" Bechtel charged that the Justice Depart-
ment changed its position on these issues between the signing and
entry of the decree.'" It claimed with respect to issue (1) that it
had bargained for and obtained the Department's agreement that
the decree would serve as the Departmental policy,'" only to have
an official later say that the case was sui generis and that the
Department was still formulating its policy.'" With respect to
issue (2) Bechtel pointed out that Justice had stated in its Com-
petitive Impact Statement (CIS) that Bechtel was prevented from
boycott enforcement in -the U.S. but not in an Arab country,m
then later, in its Response to Comments (RTC), stated that such
territorial limitation was premised on three factors related to
foreign sovereign compulsion."1 Regarding issue (3), Bechtel
charged that Section VI of the decree gave it the right to seek
modification of the decree in order to conform it to the unilateral
and specific selection exception of the EAA."2 This would allow
Bechtel, if a bona fide resident of an Arab country, to make a
boycott based selection of U.S. subcontractors. 3 Bechtel said that
the Justice Department originally assented to that interpretation,
but subsequently interpreted the section to mean that any
modification must nevertheless be consistent with antitrust law.'
See generally Record, U.S. v. Bechtel, supra note 32. Cf. 240 ITEX A-1, Jan. 16, 1979.
IU See Memorandum of Decision, U.S. v. Bechtel, supra note 27, at "Objections to Entry of
Proposed Consent Judgment."
try I&.
.1 d.
"' See note 33 supra.
Justice Department CIS, U.S. v. Bechtel, supra note 23, at 11.
Justice Department, RTC, supra note 34, at M-2.
- See Memorandum of Decision, note 27 supra, at "Objections to Entry of Proposed Con-
sent Judgment."
15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c).
See Justice Dept., RTC, note 34, supra. at M-3.
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The District Court, in its Memorandum of Decision entering the
decree, upheld the Department's interpretation of the decree as
issue (3) and implicitly rejected Bechtel's claims regarding issues
(1) and (2).z°
Bechtel's claim concerning issue (2), that the Department chang-
ed its position regarding the territorial limitations of antitrust law
is probably unwarranted since the qualifying factors which the
Justice Department subsequently referred to were noted in its
Competitive Impact Statement. This formal expression should
prevail over any informal statements made by Department of-
ficials during negotations 0 °
Bechtel's claims with respect to issue (1), whether the decree
represents the Department's policy, and issue (3), what kind of
modification Bechtel may obtain, can be considered together. Iden-
tification of the Department's policy may shed light on the extent
to which it is willing to conform the decree to the EAA.
3. The Justice Department, Antitrust Law and the Export Ad-
ministration Amendments
The parallel development of the policies of the EAA and the
Justice Department indicates that they should be consistent, par-
ticularly on the issue of unilateral and specific selection. Although
the Bechtel case was filed prior to passage of the EAA, the
Department refrained from moving for entry of final judgment un-
til after enactment of the EAA and its implementation by Com-
merce. The reason given was that the Justice Department wanted
to review the decree and obtain public comments "from the widest
possible perspective."' 7 This indicates that the Justice Depart-
ment may have been influenced by the debate over the EAA in
determining its own antitrust policy regarding international
boycotts. The Bechtel suit influenced the EAA as well: it has been
asserted that the Bechtel decree was the source of the EAA's uni-
lateral and specific selection concept.2 Furthermore, the decree
was often discussed in the legislative history of the EAA. It was
repeatedly stated that antitrust law should complement the EAA
' See Memorandum of Decision, 'note 27 supra, at "Effect of Enactment of EAA of
1977."
1 Bechtel's claim relates to Justice's alleged change of position regarding territoriality.
There remains the important question of what Justice's position should be.
Justice Department, RTC supra note 34, at M-1.
See Amicus Brief, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. v. Bechtel, Civ. No. C-76-99 (N.D.
Cal., Jan. 16, 1976) at 7 (on file at the offices of GA. J. INrL & CoMP. L.).
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but was of itself an inadequate means of regulating boycott com-
pliance.'
Despite this legislative intent to have complementary laws in
the antiboycott area, the Justice Department, in the Response to
Comments, emphasized its independence. 10 It pointed out that
the EAA expressly refrained from superseding or limiting the
operation of the antitrust laws,"1 and said that the EAA and
the Sherman Act were "independent statutes which may apply to
the same conduct."2"2 The Department went on to state that "in
several significant respects the [EAA] and the regulations issued
thereunder appear to permit conduct which may, notwithstanding
such promulgation, raise antitrust problems." ' The RTC appears
to reject any idea that the two regulatory schemes are consistent.
In fact, the RTC, taken as a whole, seems to reject the idea that
the two schemes ought to be consistent.
But this asserted independence is obscured by other Depart-
ment statements in the RTC which suggest that the EAA serves
as a standard for antitrust policy. The Department cited the EAA
as an expression of congressional policy which, along with an-
titrust law, would be inconsistent with a decree which failed to ap-
ply the principle of comity."1 ' In response to the charge that the
decree allowed Bechtel to implement the boycott, the Department
said that allowing Bechtel to provide pre-award services was per-
mitted by the decree as well as by the EAA and EAR."5 But the
Department cannot have it both ways: if the statutes are indepen-
dent, then congressional policy pertaining to one does not justify
agency action taken pursuant to the other. The Justice Depart-
ment should either provide independent justification for its en-
forcement policy and furnish Guidelines for compliance with that
policy, or conform its enforcement to the pertinent objectives of
the EAA.
IV. INCONSISTENCIES AMONG THE LAWS
This section notes the major inconsistencies among the three
antiboycott laws. It addresses a different sort of problem for
businesses than that discussed in Section III. The concern here is
- See note 25 supra.
t, For a more extensive discussion of agency reflex behavior in attempting to defend and
extend its bureaucratic turf, see Note, Interagency Conflict. A Model for Analysis, at 241
aupra.
'" Justice Department, RTC, supra note 34, at M-3, n. 11.
Id at M-1.
" Id at M-3, n. 11.
Id. at M-1.
Id at M-2, n. 5.
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compliance, not merely with a single set of rules, but with three
distinct and often contradictory sets of rules, each enforced by a
different agency. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed
that the penalties imposed by each law have equal weight and
hence equal deterrent effect. The direct result of the convergence
of these inconsistent laws is that, in any given situation, a com-
pany's activity is limited to what is permitted by the most restric-
tive law.
A. Jurisdiction
1. EAR
The EAR have a clear definition of jurisdiction. In order to
come within the EAR the potential defendant must be a "U.S. per-
son"216, and the particular transaction in question must be "in U.S.
commerce." 17 The "U.S. person" category includes all U.S. resi-
dents and all controlled in fact foreign subsidiaries or affiliates.
"U.S. commerce" covers all activities of controlled in fact foreign en-
tities which are directed by a domestic concern, or involve acquisi-
tions from the domestic concern by the controlled in fact foreign
affiliate to fill an order for the boycotting country.
2. Antitrust
U.S. antitrust laws apply to all persons within U.S. personal
and subject matter jurisdiction. There is no U.S. person test
as such, but antitrust law can probably reach most controlled
in fact foreign entities through personal jurisdiction. The Bechtel
decree, for example, applies to all of Bechtel's subsidiaries
without regard to residence or control in fact.218 Antitrust
subject matter jurisdiction is also broadly defined by a U.S.
foreign and interstate commerce test, 19 but it is unclear to
what extent this test parallels the EAR "U.S. commerce" test.
The latters looks more to the import and export of goods and ser-
vices, as directed by a domestic concern,' while the former
looks to the impact of a restraint of trade upon U.S. foreign and in-
terstate commerce. It appears that antitrust law can reach farther
than the EAR, but considerations of comity may restrain enforce-
ment of the law." 1
'o See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
31 See notes 50-52 and text supra.
'8 U.S. v. Bechtel, Civ. No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 16, 1976) at Section I.
Si L. SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 715.
- See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
' See Justice Department, Antitrust Guide, supra note 31, at 6-7. See also Kestenbaum,
supra note 3, at 806.
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3. TRA
The TRA and the Guidelines have a broader and more complex
definition of jurisdiction than the other two laws. Tax penalities
apply wherever there are tax benefits to be lost. Foreign tax
credit allowable under sections 901, 902, and 960 can be reduced;'
there can be an additional category of Subpart F income, as deter-
mined under section 952(a)(3); and there can be an addition of the
amount of deemed distribution to shareholders under I.R.C. sec-
tion 995(b)(1)(F)(ii).' Persons who can claim these tax benefits in-
clude domestic individual shareholders, domestic corporations,
foreign individual shareholders, and foreign corporations. Under
the TRA, shareholders, both domestic and foreign, in corporations
which are U.S. taxpayers, can lose their tax benefits if their cor-
poration engages in PCIB. This differs from the EAR, which do
not impose penalties upon domestic or foreign individual
shareholders. 5 In addition, U.S. taxpayers who do not fall within
the U.S. person test of the EAR may still lose their U.S. tax
benefits. One writer developed the following example of the
TRA's broad jurisdiction:
[A] presumption (of PCIB) will arise from participation in or
cooperation with a boycott by a foreign corporation which is
owned to the extent of 50%/ by a foreign trust, the beneficiary of
which is a non-resident alien individual who derives foreign
source income effectively connected with his conduct of a trade
or business in the United States, in connection with which in-
come the individual claims a "direct" § 901 foreign tax credit.'
The writer inserts the caveat that in such a situation the taxpayer
could probably rebut the presumption of PCIB by showing that
the U.S. operation was separate and identifiable from that which
practiced PCIB. Nevertheless, the example demonstrates a way in
which the tax law can reach beyond the EAR and antitrust law.
The tax law is also broader in scope due to: (1) the definitions of
"controlled groups" a" and "related persons;"" and (2) the TRA's
presumption that PCIB by any member of a controlled group or
by a related person constitutes PCIB by all other members or
- I.R.C. §§ 999(cX12), 908(a).
- I.R.C. § 952(aX3B).
I.R.C. § 995(bX3).
- See 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(b), Examples of "United States Persons" (iv) (U.S. individuals
who are shareholders are not "domestic concerns"); and (vi) (foreign national resident in
foreign country is not a U.S. person because not a U.S. resident or national).
BNA Portfolio, supra note 2, at A-17. See note 290 infra.
See note 149 supra.
See note 150 supra.
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related persons.2 Since the controlled group is defined in terms
of 500/0 or more ownership (whereas the EAR defines controlled in
fact corporations in terms of 50/o or more ownership in certain
circumstances and 25/o or more in other circumstances) it will
often happen that a corporation subject to EAR prohibitions will
also be subject to tax penalties. However, tax penalties will apply
to more corporations as a result of one instance of PCIB than will
EAR sanctions, due to the presumptions of PCIB for members of
controlled groups and related persons.'
B. Prohibitions
The laws take quite different approaches to prohibitions.
Whereas the EAR prohibit activities which are taken with intent
to comply with or further the boycott, regardless of the existence
of an agreement, 1 the Guidelines penalize a U.S. taxpayer who
agrees to PCIB.m The authority of the Treasury Department to
infer an implied agreement from the over-all course of conduct in-
creases the scope of the prohibition but the activity still must be
related to an agreement. The Bechtel decree applies to agree-
ments, as well as contracts, arrangements, and understandings, but
prohibits only those which are anti-competitive.' Consequently,
one law looks mainly to activities, another to agreements, and the
third to contracts, agreements, arrangements, and understand-
ings made in the course of a combination or conspiracy.
1. Refusal to do Business
Some activities which are explicitly prohibited by the EAR will
not trigger tax penalties (unless the activities are part of a course
of conduct from which an implied agreement can be inferred). For
example, if a U.S. company chooses suppliers or insurers only
from among those who do not do business in or with the boycotted
country, but the contract with the country does not specify this
selection method, no tax penalties will be imposed since there is
no PCIB agreement.2 The EAR prohibit this method of selection
- I.R.C. § 999(b)(1), 999(e).
The loss of tax benefits can of course be mitigated. See notes 137-139 and accompany-
ing text supra.
D See notes 53-56 and accompanying text supr.
U See notes 153-158 and accompanying text supra
- See notes 159-163 and accompanying text supra.
' U.S. v. Bechtel (Civ. No. C-76-99 (NJD. Cal., Jan. 16, 1976) at Section IV(A)L (C), (D), (E).
- Guidelines H-14, H-15. The Treasury Department will consider this transaction in the
context of the overall course of conduct, but as an isolated act it is insufficient to trigger
tax sanctions.
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since it is a refusal to do business.' The Bechtel decree provides
a narrower prohibition than the EAR: the selection method noted
above would not be a violation of antitrust law unless the U.S.
company refuses to deal with suppliers because they are
blacklisted U.S. persons.8 7
Another example concerns tenders. If a U.S. company tenders a
bid on a contract which requires boycott compliance, acceptance of
the bid by the boycotting country results in an agreement to refuse
to do business under the EAR.2s The Guidelines will only find a
PCIB agreement upon the signing of the contract: tendering a bid
which is accepted does not itself constitute an agreement. 9 As in
the case of selection of suppliers, tendering bids can run afoul of
the EAR without incurring tax liability.
In other situations the Guidelines are stricter than the EAR.
The Guidelines impose tax penalties on U.S. taxpayers who sign a
contract requiring them to comply with the boycotting country's
laws.2 0 On the other hand, the Guidelines permit signing a con-
tract which provides that the laws of the boycotting country will
apply."" The rationale is that the "comply clause" is an express
PCIB agreement while the "will apply clause" is not, since it nor-
mally relates to issues of contract interpretation and dispute
resolution. The EAR do not make such a distinction between
"comply" and "will apply." Instead they distinguish between con-
tracts which require compliance with boycotting country laws
generally, and contracts which require compliance "with the laws
of the boycotting country, including boycott laws."2 '2 The former
are permissible but the latter are not since the latter constitute
agreements to refuse to do business.
2. Furnishing Information.
The EAR furnishing information rules are based on the assump-
tion that compliance by firms with information requirements of
boycotting countries is an essential component of the boycott. The
EAR seek to carefully regulate what information may be supplied
to boycotting countries. The Guidelines, on the other hand,
generally permit the furnishing of information, on the grounds
that this is not a PCIB agreement. The Bechtel decree, in further
m 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(aX3).
' See notes 184487 and accompanying text supra.
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a). Agreements to Refuse to Do Business, Example (ii).
' Guidelines H-24, H-25, H-26.
m0 Guidelines H-3, H-4.
UI Guidelines H-3.
' 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a), Agreements to Refuse to Do Business, Examples (iv) and (v).
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contrast, does not prohibit Bechtel from furnishing information
about itself or about the blacklist status of past suppliers and sub-
contractors. However, the decree does enjoin Bechtel from mak-
ing recommendations of subcontractors which are based on their
blacklist status, soliciting bids on a blacklist basis, and selecting
subcontractors by means of a blacklist."8 These injunctions pro-
bably serve effectively as prohibitions against furnishing informa-
tion concerning the blacklist status of subcontractors to boycot-
ting country parties.
Given the fact that the EAR and Guidelines present different
views on furnishing information, inconsistencies between the sets
of rules are likely to arise. An obvious inconsistency is that
the EAR prohibit the furnishing of negative certifications,2" but
the Guidelines permit them.2 " Another inconsistency is that the
EAR permit self-certifications 6 while the Guidelines prohibit
them."7 The reason for the latter inconsistency may be that the
two sets of rules are developing in opposite directions: the EAR
self-certification rule was adopted as a concession to business
practicality," 8 whereas the informal Guideline was adopted to
"tighten up" the Treasury rules on letters of credit.2 9
C. Letters of Credit
Letters of credit are explicitly regulated by the EAR and
Guidelines but not antitrust law (though regulation by the lat-
ter cannot be entirely ruled out). The EAR and Guidelines both
apply to the same range of LOC activities: opening, honoring, pay-
ing, confirming, negotiating, and otherwise implementing LOCs.251
Both sets of rules permit a bank to advise its beneficiary of
receipt of a prohibited LOC and of its terms.21 The duties of banks
are extended by each set of rules to matters beyond the face of a
LOC, but these duties may vary.
The EAR employ rebuttable presumptions to determine the
U.S. v. Bechtel, Civ. No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 16, 1976) at Sections IV(F), (G), (H),
and V(E).
See notes 66-72 and accompanying text supra
Guidelines H-17.
See note 69 supra.
N, See note 172 and accompanying text supr.
See Ludwig and Smith, note 1, supra, at nn. 110-112.
"'See note 21 and accompanying text supra
15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(2); Guidelines H-29A.
-4 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(4); § 369.2(f), Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit,
Example (ii); Guidelines H-29A. Both sets of regulations protect banks in case of clerical
errors. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f), Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, Example
(x); Guidelines D-4.
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residence of beneficiaries and to determine whether the transac-
tion which underlies the LOC is within U.S. commerce. For exam-
ple, a bank may rebut the presumption that a certain LOC in-
volves a U.S. beneficiary and that a transaction is within U.S.
commerce by a showing of facts, including those not apparent on
the face of the LOC, which could reasonably lead a bank to con-
clude that the beneficiary is not a U.S. person or that the transac-
tion is not within U.S. commerce.2 52 The EAR presumptions are in-
tended to aid a bank in determining which LOCs are covered by
the law, but this requires the bank to look beyond the face of the
LOC.
The Guidelines have no commerce test for determining jurisdic-
tion over LOCs, but do have a U.S. person test, albeit a somewhat
different one than that of the EAR. Guidelines H-29A prohibits
implementation of LOCs which require self-certification of
blacklist status, except in certain situations. If the beneficiary is
neither a boycotted country person nor a U.S. person, and if the
bank has no reason to know that it could not obtain the certifica-
tion because of the nationality, race, or religion of the
beneficiary's ownership, management, or directors, then the bank
may implement the LOC. H-29A distinguishes between U.S. and
non-U.S. persons as beneficiaries, and contains a reasonableness
standard for knowledge that certifications can not be obtained. It
thus explains in a crude fashion the duty of a bank to look beyond
the face of the LOC to determine some facts concerning the
beneficiary.
The two sets of regulations also differ in their treatment of a
bank's knowledge of the beneficiary's intent. The EAR prohibit
the implementation of a LOC which is legal on its face but where a
bank knows that the beneficiary has agreed to supply prohibited
information.26 A bank is also prohibited by the EAR from requir-
ing a negative certification where the LOC is legal on its face but
the bank acts on what it knows the boycotting country purchaser
customarily requires.5 The Guidelines, in contrast, merely state
that when a bank has reason to know that a person was inserted
as the beneficiary in order to furnel payment to another, the LOC
will be viewed as having the other person as beneficiary.2' A
15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(6)-(10). See notes 76-77 supra.
15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f), Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, Example
(xvi).
25 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f), Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, Example
(xv).
' Guidelines H-29A.
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general'duty is imposed upon banks by the EAR with respect to
implicit agreements made by their beneficiaries, while the
Guidelines impose a duty only with respect to one type of implicit
agreement.2s
In addition to a broader knowledge standard for banks regard-
ing the intent of their beneficiaries, the EAR also prohibit more
types of LOCs than do the Guidelines. The EAR contain a general
prohibition against the implementation of any LOC whose
underlying transaction is also prohibited.257 The Guidelines only
proscribe implementation of a LOC where it would result in
refraining from doing business with a U.S. person."M It is an open
question whether under the Guidelines the inference of an implied
agreement by the bank to engage in PCIB could be made
whenever the transaction underlying the LOC constitutes PCIB.5 9
Specific rules are provided by the EAR on this point, but not by
the Guidelines.
Another difference between the sets of rules concerns fur-
nishing of information. The EAR prohibit the use of negative cer-
tification in LOCs.20 However, a bank may implement a LOC
which contains a self-certification, if it has not insisted upon such
certification. 1 Although the Guidelines generally prohibit use of a
negative certification in a LOC, the IRS Letter Ruling per-
mitted one where the U.S. beneficiary had made a good faith ef-
fort to exclude it."2 The Guidelines also prohibit the use of self-
certification in LOCs,m contradicting the EAR.
4. Evasion
The evasion clause of the EAR has no specific counterpart in
the Guidelines or in antitrust law. The Guidelines' inferred agree-
ment and the antitrust concept of conspiracy serve much the same
purpose, however. For the EAR and the Guidelines, the evasion
clause and the inferred agreement expand the scope of express
' Forthcoming Guidelines may contain rules in this area.
7 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(1).
" Guidelines H-29A, H-29B. H-29A involves self-certification and H-29B concerns
negative certification. Although negative certifications are generally allowed, their use in
LOCs is declared to be refraining from doing business.
m' See notes 164-167 and accompanying text supra. A recent IRS Letter Ruling dealt
with a LOC, but did not address the issue of the implementing bank's PCIB, because the
Ruling was directed solely toward the beneficiary.
15 C.F.R. § 369.2(F), Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, Example (vi).
MI 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f), Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, Example (xiv).
Supra note 165. The IRS warned however that repeated failure to secure a permissi-
ble LOC would result in an inference of a PCIB agreement.
' Guidelines H-29A. See also note 172 supra
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prohibitions without delineating in advance those activities which
are specifically prohibited. Similarly, the vague concept of con-
spiracy enables the Justice Department to punish business con-
duct in a wide range of cases. As the Commerce, Treasury, and
Justice Departments encounter novel situations, such as new
boycotting country requirements and new business activities,
they can respond with their flexible but unpredictable enforce-
ment tools. The extent to which the Departments respond in con-
cert will determine the extent of future legal inconsistencies.
One current inconsistency concerns risk-of-loss clauses. The
EAR prohibit the use of these clauses if they are imposed on a
supplier because of its blacklist status.' If the clause was in-
troduced after the effective date of the EAR it is presumed to be
an evasion of the refusal to do business prohibition.25 The
Guidelines, however, allow the use of a risk-of-loss clause without
limitation, the rationale being that the inability of a blacklisted
supplier to meet the conditions of a "delivered-in-country" clause
is due to the boycotting country's laws, not to any real
agreement'" between the company which imposed the burden and
the boycotting country. Nevertheless, an implicit agreement
might be inferred by the Treasury Department.
Several activities which constitute evasion under the EAR are
allowed under the Guidelines, the latter being more permissive
regarding furnishing information. The EAR contain three ex-
amples of evasion involving the prohibited furnishing of informa-
tion to a boycotting country through an agent in another
country; 7 these same actions are permitted under the Guidelines.
Other EAR examples involve evasion by means of diversion of
sales to a foreign subsidiary.' This type of arrangement usually
remains within the jurisdiction of the TRA, since the Guidelines
do not employ a "U.S. commerce" test, and thus the prohibition of
diversion turns on the existence of a PCIB agreement.
C. Exceptions to the Prohibitions
1. Import Requirements of the Boycotting Country
Both the EAR and the Guidelines recognize the legitimacy of a
primary boycott, and permit a U.S. company to comply with the
15 C.F.R. § 369.4(d).
'Id.
Guidelines J-7.
15 C.F.R. § 369.4, Examples (iii), (v), (viii).
E.g., 15 C.F.R. § 369.4, Example (iv).
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laws of a boycotting country with respect to the importation of
goods from the boycotted country. u9 The antitrust law also
recognizes the legitimacy of primary boycotts by means of the
principle of comity. "
While the EAR provide exceptions for compliance with a
boycotting country's laws regarding importation of both goods
and services, the TRA excepts only the importation of goods. 1
The EAR limit their exceptions by prohibiting the use of negative
certificates of origin, but such certificates are permitted by the
Guidelines. Nevertheless, EAR exceptions are broader than those
provided by the Guidelines or the Bechtel decree, since the EAR
permit a U.S. company to comply with the import laws of the
boycotting country respecting goods produced by nationals of the
boycotted country, without regard for the residency of those na-
tionals. 7 ' Neither the TRA 73 nor Bechtel" permit compliance
with import laws with respect to goods produced by nationals of
the boycotted country who are resident in the U.S.
2. Unilateral and Specific Selection
The EAR unilateral and specific selection exception permits a
resident of a boycotting country, whether a U.S. person or a
boycotting country national, to select suppliers of goods and ser-
vices on a blacklist basis.7 5 The Guidelines also permit this activi-
ty, 2 70 although an inference of an implied agreement can be made if
other factors are present.2" Bechtel indicates that antitrust law
does not permit a U.S. contractor, even a bona fide resident of a
boycotting country, to make a unilateral and specific selection
which involves the use of a blacklist of U.S. subcontractors. This in-
consistency is the source of much of the controversy surrounding
the Bechtel decree, as the defendant sought to have the EAA ver-
sion of the unilateral and specific selection exception applied.
- EAR § 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-1); IRC § 999(b)(4)(B).
' See Justice Department Antitrust Guide, note 31 supra, at 6-7; Kestenbaum, note 3
supra, at 806.
' Cf. EAR § 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-1); IRC § 999(b)(4)(B).
15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-1)(1)(iii).
Cf. IRC §§ 999(b)(3)(A)(i); 999(b)(4)(B). The general prohibition against refusals to do
business with boycotted country nationals is limited by the narrow exception pertaining to
importation of goods made in the boycotted country, presumably even though such goods
are produced by boycotted country nationals.
' See Kestenbaum, note 3 supra, at 784.
"' 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c).
6 Guidelines J-10.
'1' Id. The statement that an inference will not be made "solely from the provision in a
contract that goods or components must be produced by a specific company.. ." implies that
the presence of additional factors could lead to an inference of PCIB. See, e.g., Guidelines
H-3, H617.
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The decree is consistent with the EAR, however, in allowing a
U.S. person to comply with unilateral and specific selections which
are made by boycotting country nationals. A further consistency
is that both the EAR and the Bechtel decree limit the exception
by prohibiting U.S. companies from providing any services to
boycotting country clients which involve the companies' use of a
blacklist."' Here the similarity ends. The EAR impose an addi-
tional limitation upon unilateral and specific selections: the
selected goods must be identifiable as to their source of origin at
the time of entry into the boycotting country, and the selected
services must necessarily and customarily be performed in signifi-
cant part within the boycotting country2 9 Bechtel imposes no
such limitation on selections by the defendant's clients.
The Bechtel decree binds only Bechtel, and the Justice Depart-
ment has stated that it is sui generis. But the decree stands as the
foremost indication of Justice Department policy on the antitrust
implications of foreign boycotts, and thus effectively eliminates
the use of the unilateral and specific selection exceptions provided
by the EAR and the Guidelines. The decree strongly suggests
that firms using this exception are exposed to antitrust liability
which includes both Justice Department prosecution and private
antitrust damages suits.2 80 This exposure is made more threaten-
ing by the fact that compliance by a U.S. person with a unilateral
and specific selection made by another must be reported to the
Commerce Department. 1 Such reports are on file in the Freedom
of Information Room of the Commerce Department.21 Thus the
private antitrust plaintiff need only peruse the unilateral and
specific selection compliance reports to discover possible antitrust
violators.
3. Local Law Exception
The local law exception of the EAR is without parallel in either
the Guidelines or the antitrust decree. However, the decree is prob-
ably consistent with the first part of the EAR exception allowing
compliance with local law for activities exclusively within the boy-
cotting country," since in those situations where the EAR test of
-8 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c). For a discussion of Bechtel prohibitions, see notes 184-194 and ac-
companying text supra
9 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(cX1).
See Weadon, note 3 supra, at 4.
15 C.F.R. § 369.6, Example (v).
m 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(c).
2" 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-1).
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"exclusively within the country" is satisfied, the Justice Depart-
ment would probably not have subject matter jurisdiction, due to
the principle of comity and the fact that there would be little or no
unreasonable impact on U.S. commerce.
The Guidelines, in constrast, impose tax penalties if there exists
a contract which provides that the taxpayer will comply with the
boycotting country's law. Even with respect to activities ex-
clusively within the boycotting country, where the EAR would
allow a U.S. company to discriminate against nationals of the
boycotted country, the TRA penalizes any agreement to do so.2"
The second part of the EAR local law exception permits a U.S.
person who is a bona fide resident of the boycotting country to com-
ply with local laws regarding importation of goods. To fall within
this exception the bona fide resident's imports must meet the iden-
tifiability requirement of the unilateral and specific selection ex-
ception, and the goods must be for the U.S. person's own use.2"
Any use of this second part of the local law exception would be
prohibited by the antitrust decree if it involved selecting among
U.S. subcontractors by means of a blacklist. The Guidelines would
also penalize use of this part of the exception if there were an ex-
press or implied PCIB agreement.
D. Reporting Requirement
The EAR require any U.S. person to report any request to fur-
ther or support the boycott,2" provided that the transaction is in
U.S. commerce. Reports must be submitted to the Commerce
Department quarterly, and must include copies of the request,
plus a statment by the U.S. person indicating whether it intends
to comply or has already complied with the request."7 A U.S. per-
son may designate another individual to report requests on his
behalf.'
Reporting is also required by the TRA; U.S. taxpayers must an-
nually report all requests involving PCIB to the Internal Revenue
Service.2' In addition to requests made to taxpayers, all U.S. per-
sons must report all operations in or related to countries on the
Treasury Secretary's boycotting country list, whether or not
IRC § 999(bX3XAX1).
m See notes 102-03 and accompanying text supra
' See notes 116-122 and accompanying text supra
" Up to 75 requests can be reported on one Multiple Transaction Form.
15 C.F.R. § 369.6(bX2).
IRC § 999(aX2).
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those persons have the tax benefits in question.m Both reporting
requirements apply to all members of a controlled group and to all
related persons, even though only one member engages in the
operations in question. However, arrangements may be made for
one person to report on behalf of all members of its controlled
group or for one related person to report on behalf of the others. 1
Both types of reports may be made on IRS Form 5713, which re-
quires information about operations and about the type of PCIB
request which has been received or agreed to. Aside from the in-
consistent prohibitions and the different jurisdictions of the two
sets of rules, the EAR and IRS reports require submission of
similar information. Although not an inconsistency, this results in
duplication of work for businesses.
V. IMPACT ON BUSINESS
A. Measuring the Impact
Recent Commerce Department statistics show that U.S. exports
to Arab countries have increased since the passage of the anti-
boycott laws. 2 Commerce officials cite these statistics as evidence
that, although some business has been lost in particular instances,
in general the Commerce Department has been "successful in
fulfilling the antiboycott goals of Congress while minimizing the
impact on U.S. exports."' This conclusion is unwarranted: the
statistics show only that the negative impact of the laws has not
been so great as to cause a diminution in overall exports; they do
not prove that there has been a minimum impact. A more accurate
analysis would examine the particular areas of trade which are
most likely to be affected by the laws. Such an analysis requires
several distinctions to be drawn.
The statistics, for example, do not distinguish between different
"' See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
n' Guidelines A-3. But see Guidelines A-4: each U.S. shareholder of a foreign corporation
must report the corporation's operations unless a consolidated return is filed which includes
all U.S. shareholders.
' Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1979) (testimony of Stanley J. Marcuss,
Senior Dep. Asst. Sec. for Industry and Trade, Dept. of Commerce, on renewal of boycott
provisions of 1977 Amendments to EAA, Mar. 28,1979). Mr. Marcuss stated that U.S. exports
to Middle East boycotting countries rose 18% in the year since regulations became effective.
SId. For a similar conclusion, see American Jewish Committee, The Impact of Anti-
Boycott Laws on U.S. Mideast Trade (May 1979) (unpublished study on file in offices of GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L.) The study cites increasing U.S. exports to the Mideast, as well as in-
creasing U.S. market share. Numerous factors contributing to U.S. export problems are
discussed, but the study never directly addresses the impact of the U.S. antiboycott laws; it
only mentions some modifications made in Arab country laws.
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types of businesses. Specific data are needed to determine whether
those exporters which are subject to more rigorous Arab boycott
demands are more adversely affected than firms for which the
Arabs are likely to waive boycott compliance. Arab buyers are
more willing to waive boycott requirements when purchasing
essential or high technology items such as computers, satellite
communication systems and medicines." They are less willing to
waive boycott requirements when purchasing less essential goods
such as small electric motors, brake shoes and zippers, since they
can obtain these from foreign competitors who are willing and
able to comply with the boycott.25 The Commerce Department
statistics also fail to distinguish between military and non-military
goods: it is difficult to believe that Saudi Arabia rigorously enforc-
ed boycott requirements in its purchase of F-15s, although the re-
quirements may be more aggressively enforced regarding less
sophisticated military related items. The foregoing distinctions
should be considered in any analysis of the impact of the antiboy-
cott laws. Despite the fact that there has been an overall increase
in exports, the distinctions reveal the domestic barriers to ex-
ports sought to be eliminated by a national export policy.'
This section analyzes the impact of antiboycott laws in light of
these distinctions. The information contained herein was derived
from telephone conversations and personal interviews with
businessmen, private attorneys, government officials, and lobby-
ists. Various types of businesses were examined: manufacturers,
exporters, freight forwarders, and banks. Also, firms of different
sizes were studied, ranging from Fortune 500 firms to companies
employing less than fifty people." 7 The section is organized into
two broad categories: compliance costs and impacts which are
disproportionately felt by some firms.
B. Compliance Costs
The overlapping prohibitions and exceptions of the three laws
" See Friedman, note 1 supra, at 448-49, listing other industries accorded preferen-
tial treatment under the Arab League's General Principles for the Boycott of Israel.
" An attorney who represents U.S. exporters reported that foreign competitors have
used the EAA and TRA as a bargaining tool in contract negotiations with Mideast buyers,
reminding their prospective purchasers that they are ready and willing to comply with all
boycott laws.
See President Carter, Statement on National Export Policy, Sept. 26, 1976, reprinted
in 225 ITEX AA-3 (Sept. 26, 1978).
1 The people contacted were for the most part very cooperative, and the authors wish
to express their gratitude. These individuals insisted on the utmost confidentiality in order
to avoid any publicity or blacklisting.
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impose a high compliance cost on firms which do business in the
Mideast. Compliance costs can be divided into four types: per-
sonnel cost, reporting cost, the cost of restructuring corporate
decision making, and the cost of documenting compliance with the
laws.
1. Personnel Cost
The most noticeable personnel cost is the need to retain specializ-
ed attorneys for each of the three laws. Few firms will employ the
same counsel for the EAR, the Guidelines and antitrust. This
presents significant management problems: in-house counsel well
versed in the EAR may give certain advice to ensure compliance
with that law, while contradictory advice may be offered be outside
tax counsel.
Additional personnel costs involve the hiring and training of
extra clerks to fill out forms to satisfy the reporting re-
quirements. Training is often needed for contracts and shipping
personnel. Firms have had to circulate information about the laws,
organize training sessions, conduct seminars, and bring in legal
specialists in order to inform their personnel. These are continu-
ing costs: the boycotting countries occasionally modify their re-
quests,' thus necessitating further legal advice and additional
training costs. Many firms have had to resort to quality control
measures such as the use of penalties, auditing, and in some cases
double-auditing, to ensure that clerical personnel are properly
identifying boycott requests and filling out reports to the IRS and
the Commerce Department.
2. Reporting Requirements
Despite the legislative mandate to minimize the cost of report-
ing,2" the Commerce Department uses the reporting requirement
in part to deter certain permissible activities.m Apparently this
method works: many firms, as a matter of corporate policy, do
not engage in any activity which is reportable, even if the activi-
ty is permitted by the EAR.? 1 The Treasury Guidelines also re-
m See, e.g., Gray, No Apparent EAA & TRA Conflict Posed By New Saudi Boycott
Clause, 3 MIDDLE EAST MONTHLY BoYCOTT L. BULL. 77 (1979).
50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(d) (1976).
43 Fed. Reg. 29,078 (1978).
See Ludwig and Smith, note 1 supra, at 243. The sensitivity of businesses to adverse
publicity is evidenced by the uproar caused by President Ford's announcement that reports
of boycott requests would be made available to the public. BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 25, 1976, at
35.
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quire the reporting of activities which are permitted, 802 apparent-
ly in order to monitor PCIB and to survey business conducted in
the Mideastw 8 These broad reporting requirements are used by
the Departments in their pursuit of various enforcement objec-
tives, some of which are not clearly related to the statutory man-
date, with little regard for the cost of reporting imposed on
businesses.
Considerable duplication results from the reporting re-
quirements. Under the EAR, for example, if an exporter is the
beneficiary of a LOC which requires a negative certificate of
origin, not only must the beneficiary report, but a freight for-
warder who has assumed the responsibility of assuring that all
necessary documentation accompany the shipment must report,
and the bank which is asked to implement the LOC must
report.' " Reporting under the Guidelines can also be complicated
and duplicative. Complications arise from the technical rules per-
taining to the reporting by members of controlled groups and by
related persons,805 and from the rules applicable to the use of a
single report for all shareholders of a corporation.a Of course, if
the detailed requirements for consolidating reports are not met,
there can be considerable duplication.
The reporting requirements are designed in large measure as
a policing mechanism which costs the agencies little but which is
quite expensive for businesses. The broad range of reportable ac-
tivities, together with the duplication of reports, imposes a high
compliance cost upon firms without a clear justification in terms
of the expected benefits, political and otherwise, of regulation.
Indeed, the total cost of reporting for businesses over a period of
time may exceed the value of deals lost due to inability to comply
with the boycott.s
3. Restructuring Corporate Decision Making
The antiboycott laws loom as a significant factor in the environ-
ment in which a firm dealing in the Mideast operates. The broad
threat of legal liability forces management to devote substantial
' Guidelines A-9.
m See Bricker, supra note 2, at 281.
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.6 Examples (xv) and (xx).
m Guidelines A-3, A-13, A-22.
- Guidelines A-4.
See generally J. Bennett and M. Johnson, The Political Economy of Federal Govern-
ment Paperwor, 7 POLY REv. 27 (1979). The authors provide statistics concerning number
of forms, responses, and manhours devoted to government reporting, and conclude that
bureaucrats have strong incentives to shift the cost of paperwork on the private sector.
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time to planning how to ensure compliance with the laws. This
allocation of time usually involves consultation with attorneys and
supervision of clerks and sales personnel. In addition, the laws re-
quire attorneys to intrude into situations where they are not
usually required: a company may need an attorney to supervise
the filing of Commerce and Treasury Department reports, to par-
ticipate in letter of credit negotiations, or to supervise the produc-
tion of internal memoranda to ensure that there is evidence of pro-
per business reasons for engaging in certain activities and that
there was no intent to further or support the boycott. As the ac-
tivity in question approaches prohibited conduct, the need for at-
torneys increases sharply in these over-regulated situations.
A decision to reorganize marketing structure may also require
legal counsel to ensure that the business will not be charged with
evasion. Such a decision is complicated by the need for examining
the planned structure from the standpoint of the TRA, since the
firm should seek to ensure that it can rebut an IRS inference of an
implied PCIB agreement. A firm might also seek to isolate as
"separate and identifiable" those operations having a chance of
violating tax law, in order to minimize possible tax losses. The cor-
porate alteration is further complicated if the firm's activities in-
volve substantial contracting with suppliers or subcontractors, as
this increases the chance of violating antitrust law.
Furnishing information to a Mideast buyer is no longer a task
which can be easily performed by low-level personnel. A decision
will have to be made whether the information sought will further
or support the boycott. Discerning the motives the buyer has for
requesting the information requires insight into the method by
which the boycott has been enforced by the Arab countries; fully
one-third of the evasion examples relate to the furnishing informa-
tion prohibition. 8 Personnel who are unfamiliar with what infor-
mation is normally sought from a company in its transactions with
other countries cannot readily determine whether there is a pro-
per business justification for furnishing the information.
4. Documentation of Compliance
The antiboycott laws implicitly encourage firms which are
engaged in trade in the Mideast to document justification for
certain decisions in order to be able to prove, in an informal or for-
mal administrative proceeding or in a trial, that there was no "im-
plied agreement," that there was no intent to further or support
- 15 C.F.R. § 369.4, Evasion, Examples (i), (iii), (v), (viii), (xvii), (xviii).
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the boycott, and that there was no combination or conspiracy to
boycott blacklisted U.S. firms. To invoke the unilateral and
specific selection exception of the EAR, a company will have to
document the bona fides of its agent's residency, and that the
selection was made by that resident. The EAR warn that this
type of transaction will be carefully scrutinized,'" which has
led one writer to conclude that "refusal to impute the employees'
attion to their employer is likely to lead to the creation of formal
records to document an artificial dichotomy between the corpora-
tion and its employees." 810 If an Arab customer makes the unilateral
and specific selection, the company must be able to prove
to Commerce and Justice Department authorities that pre- and
post-award services provided to the client in recommending,
evaluating, or soliciting subcontractors did not include the use of a
blacklist of U.S. persons. In addition, firms involved in unilateral
and specific selections must prepare and retain documents for
possible use as evidence in defending against private antitrust
damage actions.
To avoid a charge of evasion, a company will have to document
that any reorganization of marketing structure was justified by
reasons unrelated to the boycott. Following the evasion provision
is an illustrative example which permits a foreign subsidiary to
begin dealing in the Mideast after the domestic parent ceases
operations because of the EAR. This would require documentation
that the subsidiary's decision was taken independently of, and
subsequent to, the domestic concern's decision."' The firm's docu-
ments should also be able to meet the arguably higher burden of
proof required to rebut an inference by the IRS of an implied
PCIB agreement.
C. Disproportionate Impact
Not all firms trading in the Mideast are affected in the same
way by the antiboycott laws. The cost of compliance, the dif-
ficulties in altering operations, and the restrictions on business ac-
tivities which are imposed by the substantive provisions of the
laws are all effects which are felt by firms in different degrees.
1. Impact on Large and Small Firms
The disproportionate impact on small companies results from
both the compliance costs and the substantive provisions. Small
15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2), Compliance By A Bona Fide Resident, Example (ii).
'o Friedman, supra note 1, at 521.
' 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 Example (vii).
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exporters do not have in-house counsel who can advise them how
to comply with the various laws. As a result, they must seek out-
side counsel who are competent in this area. A single boycott com-
pliance request to a large multinational corporation may need no
more legal analysis than a request to a small exporter, but the
legal fee will bear more heavily on the smaller company. The cost
of training personnel, documenting legitimate activities, and
negotiating repugnant language out of a contract will all be pro-
portionately more burdensome to the small exporter.
There is a failure in the laws to compensate for problems caus-
ed smaller firms by selective boycott enforcement by Arab
customers. As noted earlier, the enforcement policies of the Arab
customers discriminate against exporters who do not offer high
technology or essential goods, and often small firms cannot offer
such desired items. In addition, a small exporter who refuses to
comply with the demands of the boycotting country will be at a
competitive disadvantage to foreign companies, a critical fact
since there may be more foreign competition for lower technology
sales. Furthermore, Arab countries are occasionally willing to
remove a company from the blacklist if it is willing to establish
facilities in the boycotting country equal to its facilities in Israel: a
small exporter who has even a small outlay in Israel may not be
able to invest an equivalent amount of capital in the boycotting
country.8 12
The exceptions to the EAR are tailored to meet the the needs of
large multinational corporations, but ill-suited to the operations of
smaller companies. Requirements that the company have a bona
fide resident in the boycotting country to invoke the local law ex-
ception, or the unilateral and specific selection exception, will pre-
clude many companies from utilizing the exception to diminish the
prohibitions' impact. Not only will the cost be prohibitive, but if
there is no legitimate business reason for establishing bona fide
residence other than to utilize the exception, the exporter may be
guilty of evasion. 88 Whereas a large business will have legitimate
business reasons for establishing a local office in the Mideast, a
small exporter could have difficulty justifying the creation and
use of a branch for the purpose of making relatively few transac-
tions.
" The efforts of Coca-Cola to take advantage of this Arab boycott provision involved
developing 15,000 acres of citrus groves in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Wall Street Journal,
Nov. 4, 1977, at 14, col. 1.
313 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(e), Example (vi).
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An additional and greater threat to the small firm could be posed
by the evasion clause. A large exporter can divert manufacturing
functions to a foreign subsidiary if there is some business
justification other than avoiding the prohibitions of the EAR. A
small exporter will not have a subsidiary to which it may divert
its product, and even if there were a foreign entity to perform this
function, there might be no legitimate reason which the exporter
could establish to justify the transaction.
In analyzing the tax sanctions, many large firms may decide
that the loss of certain tax benefits does not outweigh the poten-
tial profit of a particular transaction."' This will be especially true
if the penalty is triggered by an action which establishes the firm
on the boycotting country's whitelist. The loss of the tax benefits
on a single transaction will be minimal in light of the opportunities
gained. A small firm, on the other hand, will not have such exten-
sive opportunities to offset the loss of tax benefits on a particular
operation.
2. Banks
Due to the special treatment of LOCs under the EAR and the
Guidelines, banks have been affected in a unique way. The
legislative history of the EAA strongly indicates that Congress in-
tended for LOC rules to have a minimal negative effect upon
banks. 15 The Guidelines also address the particular operations of
banks; a special rule is provided which allows banks to minimize
tax losses by separating LOC operations from other banking
operations.1 6
Banks have compliance costs as their principal problem. These
costs are borne primarily by the largest U.S. banks because they
have the largest volume of LOC business. Small and medium size
banks not only receive fewer LOCs than the larger banks, but also
"' Shortly before the TRA was enacted, one corporate executive stated, "Any tax
penalties imposed under the pending legislation would be simply an extra cost of doing
business for us." BUSINESS WEEK. Sept. 27, 1976 at 38. See also J. Gray, Middle East Con-
struction and U.S. Anti-Boycott Laws, International Construction Newsletter, Vol. III, No.
2 (Feb. 1978):
... it should be observed that the loss of benefits mandated by the tax anti-
boycott provisions may not be detriminative (sic) for a contractor .... Contrac-
tors do not ordinarily utilize DISC; most Arab countries do not tax profits of con-
tractors; and the benefits of deferral can be obtained, at least in part, by report-
ing income for tax purposes on the completed contract method. Accordingly,
when a contractor is able to comply with EAA, but [not] the tax anti-boycott pro-
visions, it may make the business decision to accept the loss of tax benefits.
a S. REP. No. 95-104, supra, note 25, at 42.
' Guidelines D-3(f). See also Guidelines D-4.
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receive disproportionately fewer illegal LOCs since the prohibited
language has been negotiated out by the large banks before the
LOCs are transferred to the smaller ones. Unfortunately, smaller
banks must still employ counsel to interpret antiboycott laws, and
this cost may not be in proportion to the revenue from Mideast
LOC business or to the risk of legal liability.
Some major banks report that a substantial part of their com-
pliance cost is attributable to the necessity of controlling foreign
branch operations. This can involve training personnel and
presenting lectures and seminars to divisions which are involved
in international business and which provide services for multina-
tional corporations. In addition, large banks experience the same
management problems as do manufacturers and exporters, with
regard to reporting and checking that reportable requests are not
overlooked. Banks on occasion must have attorneys participate in
business transactions where they are not usually required. One
bank found it necessary to have its in-house counsel sit in on letter
of credit negotiations where the beneficiary was a valued
customer and there was some reason to believe that the Arab
customer would require a negative certification.
Although the EAR and Guidelines are inconsistent with respect
to a bank's duty to look beyond the face of the LOC and its accom-
panying documents, this usually does not cause significant prac-
tical problems, for the rules do not correspond with the business
reality of LOC operations anyway. The EAR require banks to
refuse to implement LOCs where there is reason to believe that
the beneficiary has implicitly agreed to provide prohibited infor-
mation, and the Guidelines require banks to insert the proper per-
son as beneficiary in order to prevent evasion of the prohibitions.
These situations rarely arise: one counsel for a major bank
described them as naive, since banks typically look only to the
LOC and accompanying documents, and consequently have no
reason to know of any underlying circumstances.
Banks appear to be coping well with the antiboycott laws due to
the fact that LOC operations are in general narrowly defined. The
EAR and the Guidelines are relatively easy to comply with, but
this situation could change with the advent of new LOC
Guidelines. The impact of the antiboycott laws upon banks should
nevertheless be carefully monitored because LOCs occupy a
strategic place in the international business transaction. Ex-
porters report that some banks are seeking to reduce compliance
costs by adopting a new procedure of advising the receipt of LOCs
but refusing to negotiate out any prohibited language, thereby
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pushing the cost of negotiation onto the beneficiary. To the extent
that major banks introduce such a practice, this will result in in-
creased costs to the beneficiaries, as well as to the smaller banks
to.which LOCs will be transferred.
3. Unique Situations
U.S. companies which were doing business in the Mideast at the
time the regulations were promulgated are favored by the anti-
boycott laws. The most obvious example is the inability of a cur-
rently blacklisted firm to have its name removed from the
blacklist regardless of its present situation. The only way to be
removed from the blacklist is to provide information to the
boycotting country which, of course, is prohibited. In addition,
numerous American firms were sent questionnaries by the Arab
boycott office just prior to the effective date of the EAR,1 7 ena-
bling them to curry favor by supplying soon to be prohibited infor-
mation. It is ironic that those firms which supplied information
and complied with other boycott requests in the past may not be
significantly affected by the EAR, whereas those companies
which refused to furnish information in the past 18 or which were
known to have conducted business with Israel may be precluded
from exporting to a boycotting country. This disadvantage may
well apply to firms which are not currently blacklisted but which
have had no prior dealings in the Mideast. An Arab customer,
rather than dealing with an unknown firm, may select only from
among those firms whose blacklist status is known from prior
dealings, or from records complied in the Central Boycott Office.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
This paper has traced the antiboycott laws from a clear
theoretical objective to a confused array of rules. It was sug-
gested at the outset: first, that the objective of an antiboycott law
is to prohibit U.S. persons from complying with certain aspects of
unsanctioned foreign boycotts, and second, that such a law should
1 See Ludwig and Smith, note 1 supra, at 264.
I' &L at 243. These firms complied with Section 3(5) of the Export Administration Act of
1969, which stated that the United States policy is to "encourage and request domestic con-
cerns... to refuse to take any action, including the furnishing of information or the signing
of agreements, which has the effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade prac-
tices or boycotts fostered or imposed by any sovereign country against another country
friendly to the United States."
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be the product of three factors: the nature of the boycott; the
nature of international trade; and the aspects of boycott com-
pliance which are to be limited. Instead of developing a single law
designed to achieve this objective, the government in less than
two years developed three distinct laws, each having a different
objective. In addition to inconsistencies and lack of clarity within
each law, there are a number of major inconsistencies among the
laws, which in a particular case may limit the scope of a firm's ac-
tivity to what is permitted by the most restrictive law, without
regard for whether overall objectives are served. The laws also
have a cumulative impact upon business which raises the cost of
compliance and which affects different industries in different
ways.
Four general conclusions can be drawn from the government's
responses to the Arab boycott. First, at the legislative level, no
fundamental objective for an antiboycott law has been establish-
ed, and consequently the regulatory schemes of the implementing
agencies have not been harmonized with regard to a single
objective. Second, at the administrative level, the agencies
have paid insufficient attention to the regulations and enforce-
ment activities of the other agencies. This agency tunnel vi-
sion, whether conscious or not, hinders efforts made within the ex-
ecutive branch to resolve legal inconsistencies. Third, the agen-
cies have not properly attended to the differences among in-
dustries and among sizes of firms, and to the disproportionate im-
pact upon industries and firms which results therefrom. Thus,
many rules are not tailored to their intended task. Fourth, the
agencies have failed to take advantage of the cooperation of
various interest groups: compromises embodied in the EAA were
the product of negotiations between Jewish groups and the
Business Roundtable. Subsequently none of the agencies has ac-
tively sought to tap this same potential for reaching a consensus
regarding enforcement. The lobbies have been left to residual
methods of influence, such as trying to open and close loopholes,
contributing to the development of inconsistencies among the
rules.19 These conclusions regarding the government's responses
to the Arab boycott point to problems which should be addressed
""0 The Business Roundtable and the Jewish lobbies were active amicus curae throughout
the Bechtel case. The Jewish lobbies succeeded in getting the TRA enacted when the EAA
failed in 1976. Then the Roundtable and the Jewish groups virtually wrote the EAA in
1977. The practical concessions to businesses made in the EAR led the Jewish groups to
seek successively stricter Treasury Guidelines. Finally, the Jewish groups dropped their
opposition to entry of the Bechtel Final Judgment, thereby supporting the Justice Depart-
ment's overriding of the EAA's unilateral and specific selection exception.
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in an attempt to improve the antiboycott laws.
Proposals for revamping the antiboycott laws under the rubric
of a National Export Policy can be arranged along a continuum
running from a minimum to a maximum of political effort.
A. Minimum Reform
The minimum effort would involve primarily the Executive
Branch, and would require each department to modify its
regulatory scheme to bring it in line with the others, as far as can
be done consistent with its legislative mandate. This could be ac-
complished by means of a presidential order or by informal
agreements among department heads. President Carter's state-
ment on a National Export Policy exemplifies this political
effort.8 0 Consistent with President Carter's general proposals, the
Commerce Department, with its thorough implementation of a
compromise statute, should be assigned primary jurisdiction for
enforcing antiboycott law. The Commerce Department should
then clarify certain rules, and eliminate the internal inconsisten-
cies noted in Section III, above. An important change would be im-
provement in communicating Departmental interpretation of rules
to businesses.32 ' The Treasury Department should be directed to
harmonize its Guidelines with the EAR, particularly on such
issues as its distinction between "apply" and "comply", and its
rule against self-certifications. A single reporting form for both
Departments could also be developed. Finally, the Justice Depart-
ment should be directed to promulgate, in the Antitrust Guide to
International Operations, boycott rules which conform its position
regarding unilateral and specific selections with that of the EAR.
Success at this minimum level of political effort depends on the
President's effectiveness as the leader of the Executive Branch: a
single coherent policy must be devised, and the agencies must
cooperate.
' See President Carter, Statement on National Export Policy, reprinted in 225 ITEX
AA-1 (Sept. 26, 1978). President Carter identified four goals of the policy: (1) to provide in-
creased assistance through Small Business Administration loans to small exporters and
through export development programs; (2) to reduce domestic barriers to exports; (3) to
reduce foreign barriers to U.S. exports; and (4) to secure a fairer international trading
system for all exporters. To reduce domestic barriers he directed department heads to take
into account the adverse effects their regulatory activities have on U.S. balance of trade,
and placed the Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps in charge of coordinating inter-
department efforts to increase exports. L at AA-8.
' See 43 Fed. Reg. 29,078 (1978). See also Ludwig and Smith, note 1 supra, at 266.
19791 409
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
B. Medium Reform
The medium level of political effort requires some congressional
action: as a first step, the TRA provisions regarding international
boycotts could be repealed. The extent of the compromise
necessary to achieve this depends to a large extent on congres-
sional perception of the Commerce Department's enforcement of
the EAA. Both legislative and executive compromises could be
made. Examples of the former are the expansion of Commerce
Department jurisdiction under the EAA, in order to offset the
loss of the broader TRA, or the elimination of the unilateral and
specific selection exception of the EAA. Examples of the latter
are the promulgation of stricter rules in the EAR, such as
eliminating self-certifications or expanding the definition of "U.S.
commerce." The medium level of political effort depends to a large
extent on the willingness of the business community to accept cer-
tain changes in the EAA and the EAR - something it is apparently
unwilling to do."
C. Maximum Reform
Creation of a cabinet level International Trade Department
would represent the maximum expenditure of political effort. "
The Department would, inter alia, have exclusive jurisdiction
over the antiboycott area. This alternative has appeal because it
would force interest groups to address a single forum, rather than
have them seek influence in different departments and congres-
sional committees, with various degrees of success. The Interna-
tional Trade Department should develop methods of rule making
which balance in a fair manner the pressure exerted by the lobbies.
Such a Department could much more readily develop a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme. It could provide special rules for each indus-
and for different sizes of firms, and would be assigned the task of
coordinating these rules in order to achieve a single stated anti-
boycott objective. The gains from this level of effort are high, but
' See Miller, Antiboycott Law Gains Suppor N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1979 § D at 1, col. 1.
The Roundtable and the Jewish groups have agreed to support an extension of the EAA
without modification. The Roundtable rejected the possibility of making the EAA more
restrictiye in exchange for repeal of the TRA.
' See Report of Senate International Finance Subcommittee on "U.S. Export Policy,"
(March 13, 1979), reprinted in 249 ITEX M-1, M-7 (March 20, 1979). See also S. 377, intro-
duced by Sen. Roth and Sen. Ribicoff, Feb. 7, 1979; and 248 ITEX C-i, March 13, 1979 (Sen.
Byrd to introduce bill to create International Trade Dept.).
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the extent of legislative political balancing required makes this
avenue of reform unlikely for the near future.
Regardless of the amount of political effort to be exerted, ad-
justing the antiboycott laws to reflect the importance of export
trade requires the development of a measure of consensus among
the actors-congress, the agencies, and the Jewish and business
lobbies -as to what should be both the means and the end of an
antiboycott law.
Mark D. Menefee
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